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ABSTRACT 
The  risk  for  endemicity  of  ASF  in  the  eastern  neighbouring  countries  of  the  EU  and  spread  of  ASFV  to 
unaffected areas was updated until 31/01/2014. The assessment was based on a literature review and expert 
knowledge  elicitation.  The  risk  that  ASF  is  endemic  in  Georgia,  Armenia  and  the  Russian  Federation  has 
increased from moderate to high, particularly due to challenges in outbreak control in the backyard production 
sector.  The  risk  that  ASFV  will  spread  further  into  unaffected  areas  from  these  countries,  mainly  through 
movement of contaminated pork, infected pigs or contaminated vehicles, has remained high. In Ukraine and 
Belarus,  the  risk  for  ASF  endemicity  was  considered  moderate.  Although  only  few  outbreaks  have  been 
reported,  which  have  been  stamped  out,  only  limited  activities  are  ongoing  to  facilitate  early  detection  of 
secondary spread. Further, there is a continuous risk of ASFV re-introduction from the Russian Federation, due 
to transboundary movements of people, pork or infected wild boar. The number of backyard farms is greatest in 
the west of Ukraine and westwards spread of ASFV could result in an infected area near the EU border, difficult 
to control. In Georgia, Armenia and the Russian Federation, the risk for endemicity of ASF in the wild boar 
population  is  considered  moderate,  mainly  due  to  spill-over  from  the  domestic  pig  population,  whereas  in 
Ukraine and Belarus this was considered to be low. In those areas in the Russian Federation where wild boar 
density  is  high,  this  risk  may  be  higher.  Intensive  hunting  pressure  in  affected  wild  boar  populations  may 
increase the risk for spread, possibly with severe implications across international borders. The risk for different 
matrices to be infected/contaminated and maintain infectious ASFV at the moment of transportation into the EU 
was assessed and ranged from very high for frozen meat, to very low for crops. 
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SUMMARY 
Following a request from the European Commission, EFSA‟s Panel on Animal Health and Welfare 
(AHAW Panel) was asked to deliver a scientific opinion on African swine fever and to update the 
significance of the occurrence and risk of endemicity of ASF in the countries neighbouring the EU 
(Term of Reference 1, ToR1). Secondly, the AHAW Panel was asked to rank the possible pathways of 
introduction  of  ASFV  into  the  EU  on  the  basis  of  their  level  of  risk,  with  a  view  to  enhance 
preparedness and prevention (ToR2). 
To address the first ToR, an update was provided on the ASF situation in the eastern neighbouring 
countries of the EU since the last Scientific Opinion on African swine fever of the EFSA Panel on 
Animal health and Welfare (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2010a). To do so, an extensive literature review was 
carried  out,  describing  the  geographic  distribution  of  ASFV,  the  epidemiological  features  of  the 
outbreaks and challenges for ASFV prevention and control in the eastern neighbouring countries of the 
EU. The literature review also screened if new information has become available about the appearance 
of clinical signs and the detection of antibodies. The same qualitative risk assessment model was used 
as in the risk assessment carried out in 2010 (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2010a), but the parameters for 
which sufficient evidence was found, possibly resulting in a change of the risk estimates, were elicited 
through expert knowledge elicitation, using a nominal group technique approach. 
The experts judged that the risk that ASF is endemic in Georgia, Armenia and the Russian Federation 
has increased from moderate to high, particularly due to challenges in outbreak control in the backyard 
production sector. The risk that ASFV will spread further into unaffected areas from these countries, 
mainly through movement of contaminated pork, infected pigs or contaminated vehicles, has remained 
high. In Ukraine and Belarus, the risk for ASF endemicity was considered moderate. Although only 
few outbreaks have been reported, which have been stamped out, only limited activities are ongoing to 
facilitate early detection of secondary spread. Further, the experts judged that there is a continuous risk 
of ASFV re-introduction from the Russian Federation, due to transboundary movements of people, 
pork or infected wild boar. The number of backyard farms is greatest in the west of Ukraine and 
westwards spread of ASFV could result in an infected area near the EU border, difficult to control. In 
Georgia,  Armenia  and  the  Russian  Federation,  the  risk  for  endemicity  of  ASF  in  the  wild  boar 
population is considered moderate, mainly due to spill-over from the domestic pig population, whereas 
in Ukraine and Belarus this was considered to be low. In those areas in the Russian Federation where 
wild boar density is high, this risk may be higher.  Furthermore, the experts judged that intensive 
hunting pressure in affected wild boar populations may increase the risk for spread, possibly with 
severe implications across international borders.  
To address ToR2, an extensive literature review looked into the detection time of the virus in different 
matrices. Then,  the  matrices  were ranked  according  to their  risk  to  be infected/contaminated  and 
maintain infectious ASFV at the moment of transportation into the EU, based on expert knowledge 
elicitation. This ranking did not take into account possible volumes of these matrices transported into 
the EU. The risk for different matrices ranged from very high for frozen meat, to very low for crops. African swine fever 
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BACKGROUND AS PROVIDED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
4 
African swine fever (ASF) is a highly contagious and fatal disease of domestic pigs and wild boar that 
is transmitted through direct contact, ingestion of contaminated feedstuffs and certain tick species. 
ASF is considered one of the most dangerous animal diseases of pigs; it affects trade and has a serious 
socio-economic impact on people's livelihood. 
ASF is transmitted by direct contacts between infected and uninfected animals; it is also transmitted 
through feeding of virus contaminated products (swill and garbage waste) and through vectors. 
ASF was confirmed in Georgia in 2007 and then it spread to the Russian Federation where numerous 
outbreaks have been notified in domestic pigs and wild boar. In 2012 an outbreak of ASF was reported 
in Ukraine and in 2013 Belarus confirmed the disease in a backyard holding in the region of Grodno, 
some forty kilometres from the Lithuanian border. In July, a second outbreak was confirmed in a 
commercial holding in Belarus, close the Russian border. Although there are not recent official reports 
of new cases in Belarus, there is indication that the ASF epidemic is still on-going there, possibly in 
domestic pigs and wild boar 
The main measures to control ASF are laid down in Council Directive 2002/60/EC and Commission 
Decision 2003/422/EC. No vaccine is available to prevent ASF infection and the control provisions 
applied in case of an outbreak are based on classical disease control measures. 
The ASF epidemiological situation has changed significantly in Eastern Europe in the last year and the 
presence of the disease close to the EU border represents a serious risk to the livestock population of 
the Union and a challenge for animal health risk managers. It is therefore necessary to better determine 
the extent of the problem in order to better target preventive and control measures in the light of the 
current evolution of the ASF epidemic at the EU border updating and completing the scientific opinion 
issued by EFSA in 2010. 
TERMS OF REFERENCE AS PROVIDED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
In view of the above, and in accordance with Article 29 of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002, the Commission 
asks EFSA for a scientific opinion on: 
 
•  Update the significance of the occurrence and risk of endemicity of ASF in the countries neighbouring 
the EU at higher risk; 
 
•  The evaluation of all the possible pathways of introduction of ASF into the EU, ranking them on the 
basis of their level of risk with a view to enhance preparedness and prevention. 
                                                       
4 Background as provided by the European Commission on 22/10/2013. African swine fever 
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ASSESSMENT 
1.  Introduction 
The ASF situation in the infected areas is very dynamic. The mandate was received on 22/10/2013 and 
the background information, provided in Section 2, was updated until 31 January 2014.  
African swine fever virus (ASFV) was introduced into Georgia in 2007 and since then it has further 
spread throughout the Caucasus and the Russian Federation. In July 2012, ASFV entered Ukraine and 
recently, in June 2013, it was notified by Belarus (OIE, 2013). In January 2014, ASF was again 
detected  and  confirmed  in  Ukraine  both  in  wild  boar  and  domestic  pigs  and  in  the  Lithuanian 
population  of  wild  boar  (OIE,  2014).  In  2009  the  European  Commission  requested  a  Scientific 
Opinion  on  African  Swine  Fever  from  EFSA  on  the  risk  of  endemicity  of  ASF  in  the  in Trans 
Caucasian Countries and the Russian Federation, and the risk for the introduction of the virus into the 
EU from these eastern neighbouring countries (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2010a). In that same period, a 
Scientific Opinion on the Role of Tick Vectors in the Epidemiology of Crimean-Congo Hemorrhagic 
Fever and African Swine Fever in Eurasia was adopted, which provided the status on the current state 
of knowledge the role of the tick vectors in the epidemiology of African swine fever (EFSA AHAW 
Panel, 2010b). Besides, a detailed Scientific Review on African Swine Fever describing the global 
occurrence, aetiology, pathobiology, epidemiology, diagnosis, prevention, control and eradication of 
ASF was carried out by a consortium between the UCM, FMV-UTL and CIRAD (Sánchez-Vizcaíno 
et al., 2009). 
This opinion deals with an update on the situation in the eastern neighbouring countries of the EU 
(The Russian Federation, Georgia and Armenia), but now also including Ukraine and Belarus, and 
aims to update the risk for endemicity (including further spread to unaffected areas) since the last 
Scientific Opinion on African Swine Fever in these countries (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2010a).  To do so, 
a  literature  review  was  carried  out,  describing  the  geographic  distribution  of  ASFV  in  the 
neighbouring countries (Section 2.1), the epidemiological features of the outbreaks (Section 2.2) and 
challenges for ASFV prevention and control in the eastern neighbouring countries of the EU (Section 
2.3). The literature review looked also if new information has become available about the appearance 
of  clinical  signs  (Section  2.4)  and  the  detection  of  antibodies  (Section  2.5).  These  aspects  were 
considered relevant for the assessment of the risk for endemicity. The same qualitative risk assessment 
model was used as in 2010, but the parameters for which sufficient evidence was found, possibly 
resulting in a change of the risk estimates, were elicited through a nominal group technique (NGT) 
expert knowledge elicitation approach (see Section 3.1 for methodology and 4.1 for the results) for 
this scientific opinion. 
The second ToR requested to evaluate all the possible pathways of introduction of ASFV into the EU, 
and  to  rank  them  on  the  basis  of  their  level  of  risk  with  a  view  to  enhance  preparedness  and 
prevention. After further clarification with the requestor of the mandate, it was decided to address only 
transport of infectious/contaminated matrices for this ToR2. Other potential pathways of introduction 
of ASF, were already addressed in the previous Scientific Opinion on ASF (EFSA AHAW Panel, 
2010). Further, movement of infected wild boar and pigs into unaffected areas (e.g. transboundary 
movement of wild boars or movement of free ranging pigs) were reconsidered in ToR1 and thus these 
pathways were not considered as a „contaminated matrix‟ that could be transported into the EU.  
To address ToR2, an extensive literature review looked into the detection time of the virus in different 
matrices  (Section  2.6).  Then,  the  matrices  were  ranked  according  to  their  risk,  based  on  expert 
knowledge  elicitation. This  ranking  did  not  take  into  account possible  volumes  of  these  matrices 
transported into the EU (see Sections 3.2 for methodology and 4.2 for the results). 
This scientific opinion did not aim to update the actual risk of introduction of ASFV as such, but only 
compared  the  plausibility  of  possible  virus  sources  to  contain  infectious  virus  at  the  moment  of African swine fever 
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introduction.  Recently, several research projects have focussed on the introduction of ASFV into the 
EU, e.g. through legal movement of live pigs (Mur et al., 2012a); through other transport associated 
routes, such as returning trucks and waste from international ships and planes (Mur et al., 2012b); 
through illegal transport of animal products (Costard et al., 2013) or by wild boar (De la Torre et al., 
2013), using semi-quantitative approaches, except for the legal import pathway that was estimated 
quantitatively. Furthermore, several detailed risk profiles were developed on a national level, such as 
the risk profile developed by the Finnish Food Safety Authority (EVIRA, 2011), the Estonian Institute 
of Veterinary Medicine and Animal Sciences (Viltrop and Jeremejeva, 2011), the Federal Research 
Institute for Animal Health of Germany (FLI, 2011) and DEFRA (2011, 2012, 2013). Most recently, 
the ARRIAH (All-Russian Institute for Animal Health) has published a new forecast on the African 
swine fever situation in 2014 in the Russian Federation (Dudnikov et al., 2014), which predicts that 
the risks of ASF spread within the country, as well as to its neighbours in 2014 will remain very high. 
The information provided in Section 2 (Update of the ASF situation) is based on information extracted 
from peer-reviewed scientific papers or media reports. When reference is made to media reports, this 
is explicitly mentioned in the text and the web-link was inserted. The information provided in the 
Section 4 (Results) is a summary of the expert opinion elicitation provided in Appendix A and B.  
2.  Update of ASF situation in the countries neighbouring the EU 
2.1.  Geographic  distribution  of  notified  ASF  outbreaks  in  the  eastern  countries 
neighbouring the EU 
2.1.1.  South Caucasus Countries 
On 5/06/2007 ASFV (Georgia 2007/1 isolate) was introduced into Georgia by ship waste, which was 
disposed around the port of Poti and subsequently the virus quickly spread through the whole country 
with fifty eight outbreaks notified to the OIE. Since 16/01/2008, there were no more notifications and 
the  situation  appeared  as  resolved  on  the  OIE  WAHID  website.  Georgia  and  Armenia  were  not 
declared free of ASF by OIE. 
 
Figure 1:   Outbreaks in the southern Caucasus (FAO EMPRES-i and media reports until 31/01/14) African swine fever 
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Since the first notification of African swine fever in Armenia, on 29/08/2007, 13 further outbreaks 
have  been  notified.  Since  30/12/2007  up to  2010, the  situation  appeared  as  resolved  on  the  OIE 
WAHID website; however, 4 more outbreaks of ASF in 2010 and other 11 in 2011, were declared to 
the OIE, which probably represented just a part of the actual epidemic. These outbreaks affected wild 
boar population and domestic pigs very close to the Georgian border (less than 30 km), revealing the 
persistence of the virus in the area (Sánchez-Vizcaíno et al., 2013). This fact is supported by the media 
that still reports cases of ASF, such as the following: in May in the Republic of South Ossetia in the 
Zanurskiy region bordering with Georgia (http://www.fsvps.ru/fsvps/asf/news/6602.html); and in July 
and August 2013 in two regions of the Republic of Armenia (Tavush and Lory) bordering with the 
Georgia  and  the  Azerbaijan  (http://news.am/eng/news/165266.html;  http://www.armtoday.info/
default.asp?Lang=_Ru&NewsID=94082). 
 
Azerbaijan has a very low density of domestic pigs, and pig husbandry is highly clustered in the few 
Christian communities. The only reported outbreak occurred in January 2008 in Nidzh, a village where 
about  half  of  the  national  pig  population  was  kept.  In  June  2011  Azerbaijan  submitted  a  self-
declaration regarding ASF free status to the OIE, however, several ASF outbreaks were reported in the 
media  from  the  disputed  area  called  Nagornyi  Karabakh  in  February  2013  (see  Figure  1, 
https://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/219762/https://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/219762/). 
2.1.2.  The Russian Federation 
Oganeysyan et al. (2013) have analysed the spatio-temporal patterns of ASF occurrence in the Russian 
Federation, in the wild boar and domestic pig populations. According to these authors three phases 
could be distinguished, since the first introduction at the end of 2007 by a wild boar in the Shatoy‟skoe 
Ushel‟e of the Chechen Republic (November 2007).  
First, they describe the development of the endemic area in the South and North-Caucasian Federal 
districts in the period 2008-2010. The ASF epidemic that began in Chechnya in 2007 continued to 
spread in the population of wild boar toward the west. Of great importance in the Russian Federation 
ASF epidemic was the epidemiological chain of events occurring in 2008 in the Republic of North 
Ossetia-Alania,  involving  direct  contact  and  ASFV  transmission  between  infected  wild  boar  and 
domestic pigs. This was facilitated by the practice of free range pig farming, traditional in the southern 
regions of Russia (Gogin et al., 2013). The first outbreaks in domestic swine were reported in June 
2008, in the Republic of North Ossetia. In the second half of 2008, OIE posted reports of 44 outbreaks 
of ASF in the Republic of North Ossetia, the Chechen Republic, the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria, 
the Krasnodarskii and Stavropol‟skiy Kray. In the three consecutive years, a total of 177 outbreaks 
were reported in this area (Oganeysyan et al., 2013).  
In a second phase, between 2011 and 2013, besides the continuation of the outbreaks in the Caucasus 
districts, the disease started to spread further from the endemic zone toward the European part of 
Russia, covering new territories such as the Saratovskaya Oblast, the Nizhny-Novgorodskaya Oblast, 
the Voronezhskaya Oblast, the Kurskaya Oblast, the Tverskaya Oblast, the Leningradskaya Oblast, the 
Murmanskaya Oblast and the Arkhangelskaya Oblast (Oganeysyan et al., 2013).    
 
Since 2012, a second endemically affected region has formed in the Tverskaya Oblast. In the first six 
months of the year, the majority of outbreaks also were registered in the Krasnodarskiy Kray, the 
Volgogradskaya Oblast (Oganeysyan et al., 2013).  
 
In  2013  many  outbreaks  were  registered  not  only  in  central  European  part  of  Russia  (the 
Voronezhskaya Oblast‟, the Moskovskaya Oblast‟), the northern endemically affected region extended 
to the eastern (the Yaroslavskaya Oblast‟) and to the western part of the Russian Federation, first of all 
to  the  Smolensk  Oblast‟  and  then  to  the  Pskov  Obalst‟,  bordering  with  Belarus.  Simultaneously 
outbreaks in domestic pigs and wild boar continued to be registered in southern endemic zone: the 
Volgogradskaya  Oblast‟  and  the  Rostovskaya  Oblast‟  bordering  with  Ukraine  (see  Figure  2).African swine fever 
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Figure 2:   ASF outbreaks in the Russian Federation reported until 31/01/2014 (source: NIIVViM, Pokrov, http://fsvps.ru/fsvps-docs/ru/iac/asf/2013/2013-
12-27/10.pdf) African swine fever 
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2.1.3.  Ukraine and Belarus 
In Ukraine, an ASF outbreak was notified on 30/07/2012 to OIE in the Zaporozhye region at the Black 
Sea Coast, East of the Crimean peninsula (OIE, 2012; see Figure 3). This was the first time ASF has 
been  reported  in  the  Ukraine  since  an  introduction  decades  ago  into  the  USSR 
(http://www.agronews.ru/news/detail/118305/). 
The second case of ASF in Ukraine was reported on 06/01/14 in wild boar, which was found on the 
riverside at the border with the Russian Federation (Rostovskaya oblast), - affected by ASF since 
2009. The last outbreak in wild boar has been confirmed in the bordering territory on 30/12/2013 
(Official  website  of  Rostov  Regional  Veterinarian  Service: 
http://uprvetro.donland.rB/Ulog/ViewPost.aspx?pageid=55665&ItemID=106918&mid=50494).   
Subsequently,  ASFV  has  been  detected  also  in  wild  boar  hunted  in  this  border  area 
(http://irtafax.com.ua/news/2014/01/2014-01-13-66.html;  http://lugansk.comments.ua/news/2014/
01/13/160104.html). Both animals seem to have escaped intensive hunting pressure just across the 
border where even helicopter driven hunts were conducted in order to exterminate wild boar. This 
outbreaks triggered disease control measures in the radius of 10 km. Three villages were quarantined 
and all backyard pigs (slightly more than 100) were slaughtered and processed as a precautionary 
measure. On 30 January 2014, ASF was found on a small farm in Lugansk Oblast in some 20 km from 
the place where positive carcass of wild boar was previously found. 
Belarus has reported ASF for the first time in backyard pigs in the region of Grodno in the west of the 
country on 21/06/2013. On 4/07/2013, the second outbreak was reported in Vitebsk region, the area 
that is close to the Russian border (OIE-WAHID, online). There are multiple media reports on ASF 
control measures implemented in Belarus before and following these two officially reported cases, 
which describe either suspicious mortalities in wild boar or domestic pigs in 2012-2013, involving 
quarantine and depopulation of domestic pigs, and depopulation of wild boar. 
On the 9
th and 27
th of January 2014, the Russian Federation lifted the temporary restrictions imposed 
earlier on the pig farms and meat-processing plants, located in the Brest Oblast and in the Mogilev 
Oblast of the Republic of Belarus respectively (http://fsvps.ru/fsvps/news/8583.html?_language=en).  
Taking into account the fact that Belarus is a member of the Customs Union, which implies the 
absence  of  customs  and  veterinary  controls  when  passing  the  Russian  border,  where  a  difficult 
situation with ASF has been seen for the past 5 years, and taking into consideration the large number 
of  ASF  outbreaks  in  the  central  federal  area  of  Russia  in  2011  (http://www.tmb.ie/destinations/
news.asp?id=185803), the risks remain that ASF can be re-introduced into Belarus. Furthermore, there 
is concern that ASFV may have been spilled over in the wild boar population in the areas bordering 
Smolensk oblast and possibly in other parts of Belarus. 
Based on the official information, there have been only a few outbreaks in Ukraine and Belarus. 
However, considering unofficial information, these may not have been the first cases. The reported 
outbreaks have all been controlled rapidly. 
 
 African swine fever 
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Figure 3:   ASF outbreaks in Ukraine and Belarus, reported until 31 Jan. 2014 (FAO EMPRES-I and media reports) African swine fever 
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2.2.  Epidemiological features of ASF outbreaks in the third countries neighbouring the EU 
2.2.1.  South Caucasus Countries 
2.2.1.1.  Outbreaks in pig holding of different biosecurity  
In Georgia and Armenia, most pigs are located in backyard farms (85-97 %, FAO, 2013) and it is this 
sector that has suffered primarily from the ASF epidemic. 
2.2.1.2.  Seasonality of the outbreaks 
Data available for historical outbreaks in Armenia (Figure 1) suggest that the ASF seasonality pattern 
seems to be different from what is observed in the Russian Federation (Figure 4). In 2010-2011 an 
increased ASF incidence in backyard pigs was observed in the beginning of production season in 
February-March (the first seasonal peak accounted for 25 % of outbreaks) and closer to its end in 
August  through  November  (52  %  of  outbreaks).  This  apparently  reflects  differences  between 
production systems in these countries. In Armenia, ASF outbreaks were nearly exclusively registered 
in the areas with free-range pig production.  
2.2.1.3.  Possible risk factors for spread of the disease  
The situation regarding possible risk factors for spread of the disease in the South Caucasus countries 
was considered as unchanged, since no new information was available since 2010. 
2.2.1.4.  Main mechanism for virus maintenance and re-introduction of ASFV  
The situation regarding maintenance and re-introduction of ASFV in the South Caucasus countries 
was considered as unchanged, since no new information was available since 2010. 
2.2.2.  The Russian Federation 
2.2.2.1.  Outbreaks in pig holding of different biosecurity  
The  production  systems  of  the  Russian  Federation  can  be  divided  into  three  main  categories: 
1) specialized, industrial production units with generally a high level of biosecurity (HB) 2) small 
commercial farms and 3) backyard subsistence production, with 61 %, 5 % and 34 % of the total 
population  respectively).  The  last  two  categories  have  typically  a  low  to  non-existent  level  of 
biosecurity. These low biosecurity (LB) sectors are generally more susceptible to incursions of ASF 
(FAO, 2013). 
An  analysis  of  all  ASF  outbreaks  since  2007  revealed  that  most  outbreaks  were  reported  in  the 
backyard pig production sector (63.2 % of total number of outbreaks), followed by cases in small- and 
middle-scale commercial pig farms (18.2 %) and outbreaks in specialized pig production units (16 %). 
Most number of affected large pig farms (36 of 51 holdings) are located in the Krasnodarskiy kray.  
In 2013, most outbreaks in the backyards sector were registered in the central part of European Russia 
– in the Voronezhskaya, Smolenskaya, Moskovskaya and Yroslavskaya oblast‟(Figure 2) (Belyanin, 
2013). ASF virus was detected at 14 slaughterhouses, meat processing plants and food stores, which 
were epidemiologically linked with the affected holdings, and the virus was also detected in 25 cases 
of illegally disposed carcasses of domestic pigs.  
Since 2007, about 40 % (39.8) of all the registered ASF outbreaks/cases were in wildlife (Figure 4). 
Since 2012, a characteristic feature was the identification of a large number of so called „infected 
objects‟ in the environment (the locations where carcasses of wild boar were discovered or infected 
animals were identified). Ninety three of 106 ASF outbreaks in wild boar in 2013 were registered as 
„infected objects‟. Since they were not considered by the official veterinary authorities as outbreaks, 
these infected objects have not been notified to the OIE (National Institute of Veterinary Virology and 
Microbiology, Pokrov). African swine fever 
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Figure 4:   The incidence of ASF outbreaks in the Russian Federation 
2.2.2.2.  Seasonality of the outbreaks 
The seasonality of ASFV detections in wild boar in 2008-2012 has been shown to be bi-modal (spring-
early summer and winter months), which has been linked to the ecology of the species and timing of 
spill-overs  from  domestic pigs  (FAO,  2013;  Dudnikov,  2014).  However,  once  data for  2013  was 
included, the seasonal incidence charts for domestic and wild pigs appeared to look very similar, 
suggesting that in 2012-2013, outbreaks in wild boar more and more often occurred as epidemics that 
were seasonally synchronised with those in domestic pigs (Dudnikov et al., 2014), and are mainly 
observed in summer and fall (see Figure 4). The authors have pointed out that the current surveillance 
for ASF in wild boar (based on a mix of passive surveillance for mortalities and opportunistic hunting, 
focused  on  the  ASF  affected  areas  and  aiming  at  population  control)  is  not  likely  to  adequately 
describe real seasonal prevalence and incidence of the disease in the Russian Federation. This issue 
needs to be urgently addressed in order to better understand evolving epidemiological patterns of ASF 
in wild boar population (Dudnikov et al., 2014).  
The lowest ASF incidence is observed from December through May, when most adult pigs in the LB 
sector have been slaughtered for the Christmas celebrations and the remaining population consists 
mainly of sucking piglets. Once the disease is introduced in the LB sectors, its prevalence starts to 
increase towards the middle of the production season (June to August), when pig population density 
and activities both increase (FAO, 2013). In conclusion, the most intense period for spread of ASFV 
can be expected to be during the summer months. 
 
Figure 5:   Seasonality of ASFV detections in the Russian Federation in 2007-2013 (total, wild boar 
and domestic pigs) 
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2.2.2.3.  Possible risk factors for spread of the disease  
Spread through introduction of infected pigs in the herd 
Introduction of infected pigs in the herd can occur during the incubation period, before the onset of 
clinical  signs,  e.g.  to  repopulate  farms.  Quarantine  measures  are  often  not  adequately  applied  in 
outbreaks in low biosecurity farms. Often, the separation of the epidemiological unit will be defined 
by the separation of backyards, or parts of villages, when in reality, the population of the entire 
settlement may be affected and should be under quarantine (Oganesyan et al., 2013). 
Spread through swill feeding with contaminated pork  
The FAO Empress report (2013) states that the source of ASFV in the Russian ASF outbreaks is 
mostly through contaminated swill.  Low biosecurity holdings commonly use swill as supplementary 
feed, often including untreated possibly ASF-contaminated pork or pig products. Often, infected meat 
may have been stored chilled, frozen or after treatment and kept over long periods of time, thus acting 
as source of ASFV, since low temperatures and some non-heat treatments do not inactivate the virus. 
Also, the involvement of catering services, using frozen meat, has lead to distant spread of ASFV 
(Dudnikov, 2011). The spread of ASF through contaminated meat has also been reported more than 
once in the media, e.g.: http://www.rg.ru/2012/08/20/reg-cfo/chuma.htmlthat.  
Additionally, Gulenkin et al. (2011) concluded from their spatio-temporal analyis of the outbreaks in 
the Russian Federation that the distribution of cases among domestic pigs coincided with the main 
transportation routes and the distribution of population density. Thus, they hypothesized that a likely 
cause of disease spread northwards into Russia could have been the trade of animals and animal 
products (Gulenkin et al., 2011).  
Spread through spill over into the wild boar population  
Of all registered outbreaks/cases of ASF in the Russian Federation, 40 % were in wild boar. Almost all 
positive wild boar were found in regions with previous detections of ASF`V infections in domestic 
pigs (OIE, 2014). Usually, the wild boar get infected through scavenging on illegally disposed ASF-
infected  pig  carcasses  from  the  domestic  sector.  Once  ASFV  enters  the  wild  boar  population,  it 
spreads as a result of active social interactions, leading to localized epidemics, where most of the wild 
boar population dies. Wild boar are capable of sustaining limited transmission for several  months 
when there is a high population density and favourable timing for virus introduction. Nonetheless, 
until now there is not enough evidence to suspect that an independent year-round ASF transmission 
cycle in wild boar got established in the Russian Federation (FAO, 2013).  
Many studies carried out in other ASF infected areas in the EU (i.e. in Sardinia),  suggest that ASFV 
tends to disappear in wild boar populations when the interaction with infected domestic or free range 
pigs is limited (Laddomada et al., 1994; Manelli et al., 1997, 1998; Rolesu et al., 2007; Mur et al., 
2012). The probability of transmission of infectious diseases through direct or indirect contact between 
susceptible  wild  boar  populations  depends  on  many  factors,  including  the  population  density 
(Diekman et al., 1995). The correlation between the wild boar density and the possible presence and 
duration of other infectious diseases, such as Aujesky disease, classical swine fever, foot and mouth 
disease, porcine circovirus type 2 and tuberculosis, has already been described (Vicente et al., 2004, 
2013; Rossi et al., 2005; Gortázar et al., 2006; Acevedo et al., 2007; Boadella et al., 2012; EFSA, 
2014b. However, it is currently impossible to know the population density threshold for ASFV spread 
in  wild  boar  populations,  due  to  lack  of  knowledge  on  the  exact  population  size  and  population 
dynamics and the epidemiology of ASF in wild boar. Further, the extent of potential spread and 
maintenance in the population are not well understood (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2014). 
In the Tver Oblast in the Russian Federation, in 2011 and 2012, for example, spill-over of ASFV by 
domestic pigs has led to numerous infections of wild boar, which might have been, again, the source 
of outbreaks in domestic pigs, through direct or indirect transmission, especially to pigs farmed in the 
backyard farms.  
It may be difficult to judge whether the infected wild boar are merely the cause of spill over from 
domestic pigs or, alternatively, if maintenance of ASFV in the wild boar population in this particular African swine fever 
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area occurs. This needs to be evaluated through an appropriately designed field surveillance scheme 
(Dudnikov et al., 2011, 2014). According to the  Empress (FAO, 2013), it seems much more likely 
that the backyard sector serves as the major source of virus from which ASFV spills both to wild 
animals and industrial units. The lack of biosecurity in this sector could be the reason for this. 
Currently available evidence does not allow concluding whether wild boar can serve as a maintenance 
host or only serve as spill over host.  
In the context of possible wild boar role in the spread of ASF, the intensive hunting of animals in the 
affected areas of the Russian Federation needs to be seriously taken into account. It is well known that 
intensive  hunting  pressure  on  wild  boar  population  leads  to  dispersion  of  groups  and  individuals 
(Sodeikat  and  Pohlmeyer,  2003;  Thurfjell  et  al.,  2013).  Heavy  hunting  of  the  affected  wild  boar 
populations may significantly increase transmission and facilitate progressive geographical spread of 
ASF, as may have been the case in January 2014 in Ukraine. The two positive wild boar found in 
Lugansk Oblast have escaped from intensive hunting on the Russian side of the border to Ukraine. 
Similar  incidents  are  possible  along  the  border  of  affected  countries  (e.g.  Belarus)  with  the  EU 
Member States, after the recent preventive depopulation campaign that was carried out in Belarus in 
wild boar.  
Spread through contaminated feed, vehicles or people 
According  to  FAO  (2013),  secondary  spread  through  fomites,  such  as  contaminated  vehicles, 
represents  1  %  of  all  the  sources  of  the  outbreaks  in  the  Russian  Federation.  Also  people  from 
holdings nearby, or professionals visiting the farms during outbreak investigations, have been shown 
to be the source of secondary spread. Furthermore, it has been reported that farmers sell potential 
contaminated feed when suspecting an outbreak, to avoid economic losses in case a confirmation of 
ASF. To identify the possible routes of ASFV transmission in the Russian Federation, based on the 
results  of  the  epidemiological  investigations,  it  has  been  shown  that  the  main  routes  of  virus 
transmission were through animal movement (38 %) and through swill feeding (35 %). At the same 
time, in 23 % of outbreaks (including single cases), the routes of transmission were not established 
(Belyanin, 2013; see Table 1). 
Table 1:   Main  sources  and  routes  of  transmission  established  during  the  outbreaks  of  ASF  in 
domestic pigs in years 2008-2012 
 
Source and transmission of virus 
 
Number  % 
Selling infected pigs  1  0,3 
Neighbourhood (infected pigs in backyards)  5  1,7 
Direct contact with humans (having a meal right at the farm)  1  0,3 
Contact during transportation, shipping, movement  108  38 
ASFV infected wild boar  4  1,4 
Swill feeding  100  35 
Not established  65  23 
Total:  284  100 
Source: Belyanin, 2013 
Spread through infected ticks 
The involvement of tick vector in epidemiology of ASF in Russian Federation is not well understood. 
Ornithodoros ticks move over short distances only by being carried passively on the host during 
acquisition of a short blood meal, but otherwise they only occupy burrows or buildings (EFSA AHAW 
Panel, 2010b). Studies on other ASFV isolates showed that titres sufficient for virus transmission to 
the  host  during  feeding  can  be  sustained  in the tick  up  to  50  weeks  post  infection  (Greig  1972; 
Wilkinson 1984; Mellor and Wilkinson 1985; Kleiboeker, Burrage et al. 1998; Basto, Portugal et al. 
2006). The virus can remain present in ticks after 3-8 years  after infection (Sanchez Botija 1982; 
Boinas 1995). European ticks of O. erraticus and O. marocanus species are able to transmit the virus African swine fever 
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trans-stadially after 5 moults (Endris, Hess et al. 1992), which may contribute to virus persistence in 
its tissues for 5 years and transmission to pigs has been shown for ca. 2 years (Boinas, 1994).  
Presence of ticks of the O. erraticus group has been reported in the Caucasus; however, knowledge of 
their distribution, host preferences and their role in the epidemiology of ASF is limited (see Table 3 of 
EFSA AHAW Panel, 2010b). Under laboratory conditions, it has been demonstrated that the ASFV 
Georgia 2007/1 strain can  replicate in the O. erraticus and that high titers of the virus up can be 
maintained, to at least 12 weeks (Diaz, Netherton et al. 2012).  
The ecological niche of these ticks in the region has not been adequately determined.  Once a focus is 
established, soft ticks may have a role as local reservoirs of ASFV, as already observed in the Iberian 
Peninsula where repeated outbreaks occurred in premises infested with ticks (Perez-Sanchez et al., 
1994; Arias and Sanchez-Vizcaino, 2002). The Spanish ASF eradication programme showed that in 
areas of outdoor pig production, where infected ticks occurred, the time to achieve eradication was 
significantly longer that in areas without ticks (Arias and Sanchez-Vizcaino, 2002).  
On-going research, carried out under the EU ASForce research project, is evaluating the presence or 
absence of Ornithodoros by serology and field confirmation of ticks detection in several European 
countries , amongst which the Russian Federation. Preliminary serological results suggest the presence 
of ticks of genus Ornithodoros in some areas, however, further studies for field detection are needed to 
confirm these findings (Sanchez-Vizcaino, personal communication). 
2.2.2.4.  Main mechanism for virus maintenance and re-introduction of ASFV  
The backyard sector commonly uses swill as supplementary feed, which may include untreated ASF-
contaminated pork or pig products. Often, the contaminated meat may have been stored chilled, frozen 
or after treatment and kept over long periods of time, thus acting as the main mechanism for ASFV 
maintenance and re-introduction. Virus re-introduction and amplification mainly takes place in the 
backyard pigs and then ASFV seasonally spills over first to small farms and then to the specialized pig 
farms (see Table 1).  
Wild boar are unlikely to be a maintenance host and seem to act as sentinels for unreported ASFV 
circulation in the LB pig production sector (FAO, 2013). The possible role of Ornithodoros ticks as a 
potential reservoir still has to be clarified. Currently there is no field data available suggesting a long 
term infection of Ornithodorus ticks in the outbreak areas. 
2.2.3.  Ukraine and Belarus 
2.2.3.1.  Outbreaks in pig holding of different biosecurity  
In Ukraine and Belarus, respectively 43 % and 80 % of the pig population are bred in industrial farms 
with good biosecurity measures in place. The outbreak in Ukraine in 2012 (Zaporizhzya Oblast) and 
2014 (Lugansk Oblast) both occurred on a small private subsistence farm. The two positive detections 
in wild boar in Lugansk Oblast were linked to movements of infected wild boar from the neighbouring 
Rostov Oblast, where ASF has been present both in domestic and wild animals since 2009. One of the 
2 officially reported cases in Belarus was in a backyard holding and other in a large commercial 
holding. 
2.2.3.2.  Seasonality of the outbreaks 
The introductions to domestic pigs both in Ukraine and Belarus occurred in summer, which perfectly 
fits  the  seasonality  pattern  of  ASF  as observed  in the  Russian  Federation.  However,  most  recent 
introductions to Ukraine with wild boar occurred during the winter period, when ASF presence in wild 
boar population has been shown to increase (FAO, 2013) African swine fever 
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2.2.3.3.  Possible risk factors for spread of the disease  
ASF has been introduced into Ukraine in 2012, through swill feeding of contaminated pork into a 
smallholder‟s farm. The epidemiological link between detections in wild boar and domestic pigs, as 
well as risks of further spread, in Lugansk Oblast in 2014 are yet to be revealed by epidemiological 
investigation and ongoing surveillance in both wild boar and domestic pigs. In Belarus, the official 
explanation  was  that  the  disease  was  introduced  through  contaminated  feed,  which  was  illegally 
imported  from  the  endemic  area  of  the  Russian  Federation  (Minister  of  Agriculture, 
http://reporter.by/Belarus/afrikanskuyu-chumu-svinej-zavezli-s-kombikormom/).  Furthermore,  it  is 
known  that civil  unrest  is  correlated  with  uncontrolled spreading  of  animal  diseases. Taking  into 
account the current political situation in Ukraine, this may be an additional risk factor for spread. 
2.2.3.4.  Main mechanism for virus maintenance and re-introduction of ASFV  
The similar population density and practices of pig keeping as well as pork trade make it highly likely 
that the mechanisms sustaining the ASFV transmission cycle in Ukraine, Belarus and The Russian 
Federation will be the same (e.g. involving primarily the backyard sector, swill-feeding and illegal 
trade of pork products). Involvement of wild boar as an occasional (transient) host or a maintenance 
host also remains a possibility to bear in mind as disease progressively spreads westwards into the 
high population density areas. 
2.3.  Challenges for ASFV detection and control in the countries neighbouring the EU 
2.3.1.  South Caucasus Countries 
The situation regarding detection and control was considered as unchanged, since no new information 
was available since 2010. 
2.3.2.  The Russian Federation 
Reporting 
It can be expected that outbreaks in the backyard sector are strongly under-reported (FAO, 2013). 
Reporting in the backyard sector strongly depends on the awareness of the pig owners, and most 
critically  on  timely  compensation.  Moreover,  under-reporting  in  the  backyard  sector  seems  to  be 
increasing as the epidemic evolves (FAO, 2013).  
Early detection of infected holdings, tracing and rapid control of outbreaks 
Detection of new ASF introductions in whichever sector is most often delayed. From 2009 to 2011, an 
average of 4.6 days and up to 11 days (Dudnikov et al., 2011) passed from the first sign of disease 
(usually indicated by death) before the ASF diagnosis was confirmed in the laboratory. These delays 
allowed for unnoticed ASFV spread, slaughter of infected animals and transportation of contaminated 
products  outside  the  outbreak  area,  sometimes  to  long  distances  (FAO,  2013).    An  additional 
constraint in the ASF detection is that there is no approved or recommended test kit for the ASF 
diagnostic  in  the  Russian Federation.  Regional  laboratories  use  different  commercial  test-kits  and 
methods  and  sometimes  false-positive  or  false-negative  results  are  obtained  (A.  Gogin,  personal 
communication, 2014). 
Tracing  of  possible  dangerous  contacts  should  be  both  retrospective  and  prospective.  This  is 
impossible in low biosecurity farms, where no records are kept of animal movement into and out of 
the farms. In this regard, all the pigs in the entire village may be considered as possibly having been in 
contact with the infected pigs. A large number of backyard and small-commercial pigs holdings are 
present with low biosecurity levels. Further, there is no animal identification system in the infected 
eastern neighbouring countries of the EU, hampering efficient tracing of animal movements. African swine fever 
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The lack of tracing system in the LB sector, together with the illegal and uncontrolled movement of 
animals and products is probably one of the most difficult challenges to be solved (Sánchez-Vizcaíno 
et al., 2013). The illegal trade of products was the origin of many outbreaks in Russian Federation in 
2011 and 2012, as well as for the introduction of ASF in Ukraine (http://www.fsvps.ru/fsvps/news/
5043.html?_language=en). Additionally, home slaughtering in the backyard sector can lead to lack of 
traceability. 
Veterinary services    
The Russian Federation has 83 independent veterinary authorities, 58 of them are in European part of 
Russia.  Capacity  and  efficiency  of  each  particular  regional  veterinary  authority  depends  on  the 
regional budget. Therefore, collaboration between the different involved stakeholders and agencies for 
prevention and early response to ASF outbreaks is complicated and may hinder efficient operation. 
Furthermore, since the disease is not dangerous for humans this has led to underestimation of the 
economic importance. 
Although at the moment all movements of all agricultural products out of the ASF-affected area is 
banned in the Russian Federation, local authorities and stockholders are very reluctant to invoke this 
measure without sufficient evidence, and decisions can sometimes take weeks or even months (FAO, 
2013).  
Further, there is a lack of sanitary slaughterhouses, and when all susceptible animals in the radius from 
5 to 20 km around the affected farm should be destroyed, several thousands of pigs may need to be 
destroyed. 
2.3.3.  Ukraine and Belarus 
Only few outbreaks were reported in Ukraine and Belarus, which have been dealt with appropriately. 
2.4.  Clinical signs 
Since the emergence  of ASFV in Georgia in 2007, no changes in the sequence of the Caucasian 
ASFV genome has been observed but only two regions have been sequenced (B464L and 5183L), 
 (Malogolovkin et al., 2012).  Field observations and experimental studies have shown that a broad 
range of clinical signs (mild to severe) can be present after infection of wild boar or domestic pigs 
with this strain. Based on the experimental inoculation studies, the incubation period ranges from 3 to 
6 days post experimental infection (dpi) and is shorter following intramuscular versus oral inoculation. 
A hundred percent mortality rate was reported after 5-11 dpi in wild boar and 7-10 dpi in domestic 
pigs. Wild boar and domestic pigs become viraemic as early as at 2 dpi and 4 dpi, respectively, while 
presence of virus in faeces and oronasal excretions occurs at 4 dpi and continues throughout the course 
of the disease until death (Gabriel et al., 2011; Blome et al. 2012, 2013).  
However, rather atypical clinical signs without a clear fever reaction were observed after low dose 
with  oral  inoculation  in  some  wild  boar  (Sandra  Blome,  personal  communication,  2014)  and 
unspecific clinical signs such as fever, lethargy and inappetence were mostly observed after both low 
and high dose infection in domestic pigs with the Caucasian ASFV strain (Claire Guinat, personal 
communication,  2014).  Additionally,  recent  experimental  infection  with a  Russian  isolate showed 
animals surviving the infection with both high and low doses (1of 6 and 2 of 6 respectively). In all the 
surviving animals, antibodies were detected from day 12 to 21 post inoculation (Gruzdev et al., 2013).  
In the field, ASF can be missed in individual animals due to unspecific clinical signs, both in the 
backyard farms as in large farms (Belyanin, 2013).  Karaulov et al. (2011) indicated that for a long 
time (12-37 days) the morbidity or mortality observed in farms may not be much higher than usual and 
ASFV could spread further through the movement of animals in these first weeks before suspicion by 
the farmers were raised about an ASFV infection.   African swine fever 
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Transmission is most efficient when a high virus load, as in blood, is involved (Sanchez-Vizcaino, 
2006).  
2.5.  Detection of antibodies 
Detection of antibodies against ASFV was reported by Georgia and Armenia in the follow-up reports 
sent to the OIE during the outbreaks in 2007-2008, and more recently in 2010 (OIE, 2014). In the 
Russian Federation, positive serological results were reported at the beginning of the outbreaks in the 
reports sent to OIE in 2008 (Follow-up reports 3, 4 and 7).  
Currently serological data are scarce since no sero-surveillance is performed in the infected countries 
neighbouring the EU.  
Kurinnov et al. (2012) reported on field studies on domestic pigs and wild boar with the acute form of 
the  disease,  carried  out  during  the  outbreak  investigations  in  the  affected  regions  of  the  Russian 
Federation, revealing up to 49 % of all sampled tissues positive for specific antibodies against ASFV, 
detected by indirect immuno-fluorescence. The same paper mentions 5 056 serum samples collected 
from domestic pigs in the affected regions (North-Caucasian and Southern Federal districts) for which  
specific antibodies against ASFV have not been detected, however, no information on the applied 
sampling and diagnostic procedure was provided.  
On the other hand, Mur et al. (personal communication, 2014) performed a serological study with 
405 samples (329 sera of domestic pigs and 76 samples of serum and organ exudates of wild boar) 
from five different regions in infected areas of the Russian Federation. Antibodies were detected in 
42 of these samples (10.4 %) from Volgograd and Tver region, 23 positives in domestic pigs and 
19 positives in wild boar samples, revealing the existence of antibodies against ASFV in the infected 
areas.  
Long-term infection with the Caucasian isolate of wild boar and pigs could not been observed in the 
experimental set-up, due to the high fatality rate (Blome et al., 2013), in contrast with the observations 
made on the Mediterranean isolates (Wilkinson 1984; Carrillo, Borca et al. 1994).  
The role of long-term carrier pigs in the maintenance and spread of the Caucasian ASFV strain is still 
under discussion. With other strains, some transmission has been observed from recovered pigs or 
their tissues. For examples, experimental infections showed that virus can be isolated from lymph 
tissues from pigs up to 6 months after infection (Wilkinson, 1984). In another study, ASFV DNA was 
detected in peripheral blood mononuclear leukocytes at more than 500 days post-infection by a PCR 
assay  (Carrillo  et  al.,  1994).  The  occurrence  of  carriers,  however,  is  only  one  factor  that  could 
contribute to the possible maintenance of ASF. 
2.6.  Detection of ASFV in different matrices 
The only study testing the persistence of the Caucasian ASFV strain in meat products (Gazaev et al., 
2012) was carried out on salted meat from infected pigs. Virus could be isolated for at least 84 days in 
chilled meat and 118 days in frozen meat. African swine fever 
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Table 2:   Detection of virus in different matrices 
Matrix of ASFV    Time of ASFV 
detection (dpi) 
Reference  Notes 
Live animals and vectors 
Domestic pigs  Portuguese isolate 
 
30 dpi  Wilkinson et al. (1989)  Observational study. 
Shedding measured by observation of 
transmission by direct contact 
56  dpi  Wilkinson et al. (1989)  Observational study. 
Shedding measured by transmission if  blood 
products were involved  in transmission 
  Isolates: 
Brazil`78, Malta`78,  
The Netherlands`86 
4-70 dpi  de Carvalho Fereira et al. (2012,2013)   Experimental study. Airborne shedding. 
 
  30-35 dpi (faeces) 
2-70 dpi (blood and 
oropharyngeal fluid) 
de Carvalho Fereira et al. (2012, 2013)   Experimental study. Observation lasted 70 days 
post inoculation. 
 
Unknown isolate  35-42 dpi  Geering, Forman et al. (1995)  Observational study. Shedding 
Spanish, Portuguese and 
Sardinian isolates 
180  dpi  Wilkinson (1984)  Experimental study. Virus isolated from 
lymphnodes. 
Spanish isolates: E75-L7 
and E75-CV1 
500  dpi 
 
Carrillo, Borca et al. (1994) 
 
Experimental study. Detected in peripheral blood 
by PCR 
Isolates from Brazil and 
Dominican Republic 
180 dpi 
 
(Mebus and Dardiri 1980); Hamdy and 
Dardiri (1984) 
In tissues 
Malta `78 isolate  180 dpi  Wilkinson, Wardley et al. (1981) 
Wilkinson (1984) 
In tissues 
Unknown isolates  456 dpi- isolate 
unknown 
(Detray 1957)  In blood 
    McDaniel (1980)  Carriers for life 
Armenian strain 2008 
 
14 days (6-20 days after 
wild boar infection) 
Blome, Gabriel et al. (2013)  Pigs infected by close contact with wild boar, 
previously experimentally infected. Blood tested. 
Followed by death. 
  ASFV Caucasus  3 days (6-9 dpi)  Blome, Gabriel et al. (2013)  Presence tested in blood, faecal swab and 
oropharyngeal fluid. Followed by death. 
  3-6 days (4-10 dpi)  Blome (2013 personal communication)  Armenian strain. Presence tested in blood and 
oral swabs. Followed by death. 
Table continued overleaf. African swine fever 
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Table 2:   Detection of virus in different matrices (continued)  
Matrix of ASFV    Time of ASFV 
detection (dpi) 
Reference  Notes 
Wild boar  Armenian strain 2008 
ASFV Caucasus 
5 days (2-7 dpi)  Blome et al. (2013)  Presence tested in blood, faecal swab and oro-
pharyngeal fluid; death after 7
th day 
3 days (6-9 dpi)  Blome, Gabriel et al. (2013)  In blood, faecal swab and oro-pharyngeal fluid 
Followed by death 
1-9 days (4-13 dpi)  Blome (2013 personal communication) 
 
Armenian strain.  Presence tested in blood and 
oral swabs. Followed by death. 
Ticks 
(Ornithodoros 
species) 
  166 days (21-187 dpi) 
 
 
260 days (21-280 dpi) 
Kleiboeker, Burrage et al. (1998) 
 
 
 
Successful transmission after 21 days post-
feeding (ticks post-inoculation) 
 
Persistence in the tick 
  21-35 days  Kleiboeker, Scoles et al. (1999)  Failed attempt to infect ticks orally. Virus was 
not detected after few weeks p.i. 
  50 weeks  Greig (1972)   
  Up to 300 days  (Wilkinson 1984)  Maintenance and transmission of infection 
  8 years  Sanchez Botija (1982)   
  2 years 9 months  Boinas (1995)   
  7 years  Basto, Portugal et al. (2006)  High titres persist for 20 weeks 
  Up to12 weeks  Diaz, Netherton et al. (2012)  Study on Georgia 2007/1  strain high titres  
persistence (observational period) 
  106 days  Mellor and Wilkinson (1985)  Infected ticks naturally transmitted virus to pigs 
after 106 days post inoculation 
  3 years  Ravaomanana, Michaud et al. (2010)   
  5 years 3 months 
380 days 
Boinas, Wilson et al. (2011)  Presence in ticks 
  Successful transmission to pigs. 
  5 years  Boinas (1994)   
  1 year  Hess, Endris et al. (1989)   
Table continued overleaf. 
 
 
 
   African swine fever 
 
EFSA Journal 2014;12(4):3628  21 
Table 2:   Detection of virus in different matrices (continued)  
Matrix of ASFV    Time of ASFV 
detection (dpi) 
Reference  Notes 
Meat and tissues 
Meat and  pork fat 
stored at 22-27 °C 
(salted) 
  16 days  Kolbasov et al. (2011)  Russian strain (Stavropol). No detection at day 
20. Virus isolation. 
Chilled meat    105 days  Adkin et al. (2004)   
  150 days in 4 °C  Kowalenko et al. (1965, as  cited in 
AHA, 2003) 
 
  150 days in 4 °C 
(muscle tissue) 
CFSPH (2010)   
  155 days, 6-8 °C  Kovalenko et al.  (1972)  Experimental infection 
Observation lasted 30 days post inoculation 
 
  104 days  Kovalenko et al. (1967)   
  84 days in 4-6 °C  Kolbasov et al. (2011)   
Frozen meat and 
organs 
  1 000 days  Adkin et al. (2004)   
  104 days in -4 °C  Kowalenko (1967, as cited in Animal 
Health Australia, 2003) 
IRA Australia (2001) 
 
  Several years  CFSPH (2010)   
  104 days  Kovalenko et al. (1967)   
  118 days  Kolbasov et al. (2011)  Observation period. Russian strain (Stavropol). 
Virus isolation 
  103 days,-6-8 °C 
(in parchment) 
Kovalenko et al. (1972)  Experimental infection 
Observation lasted 30 days post inoculation 
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Table 2:  Detection of virus in different matrices 
Matrix of ASFV    Time of ASFV 
detection (dpi) 
Reference  Notes 
Spleen    204 days, stored at 6-
8 °C 
 
280 days, placed in Petri 
dish and buried at a 
depth of 8 cm (June) 
Kovalenko et al. (1972)  Experimental infection. Observation lasted 30 
days post inoculation 
 
Skin/ fat    300 days  Adkin et al., 2004   
Bone marrow 
(meat with bone) 
  180 days  Kowalenko (1965, as cited in Animal 
Health Australia, 2003) 
 
  188 days  Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry – 
Australia (2001) 
 
  188 days (femoral), 
6-8 °C 
 
 
Kovalenko et al. (1972)  Experimental infection. Observation lasted 30 
days post inoculation 
Offal    105 days  Adkin et al. (2004)   
Skins and hides    0 days  Biosecurity New Zealand (2007) 
 
Processing sufficient enough to destroy virus 
unless production is in vicinity to infected pig 
farm and contaminated water is used. 
Meat products 
Meat  cooked for  
70 °C  for 30 min 
  0 days  Adkin et al. (2004)   
Salted meat    84 days in 4-6 °C  Kolbasov et al. (2011)  Testing only during observation period (presence 
in tissues can be longer). Russian strain 
(Stavropol) Virus isolation 
Naturally smoked 
meat 
  30 days  Adkin et al. (2004)   
  300 days  Adkin et al. (2004)   
Dried fat    140 days- Iberian and 
Serrano ham 
 
Mebus et al. (1993, 1997)  In vivo and in vitro virus assay (hemadsorption, 
immunofluorescence, virus isolation, serum of 
experimentally infected pigs tested for 
antibodies) 
Table continued overleaf. African swine fever 
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Table 2:   Detection of virus in different matrices 
Matrix of ASFV    Time of ASFV 
detection (dpi) 
Reference  Notes 
Salted(cured) and 
dried meat 
(Iberian, Serrano, 
Parma ham) 
 
Curing time in 
days: 
Iberian ham (365-
730) 
Iberian shoulder 
(240-420) 
Iberian loin (90-
130) 
Serrano ham (180-
365) 
Parma ham (360-
540) 
  140 days- Iberian 
shoulders 
 
Mebus et al. (1993, 1997)  In vivo and in vitro virus assay (hemadsorption, 
immunofluorescence, virus isolation, serum of 
experimentally infected pigs tested for 
antibodies) 
  180 days- Serrano  Gregg (pers comm) in Animal Health 
Australia (2003) 
 
  399- Parma ham  McKercher, Yedloutschnig et al. (1987)  US experiment 
Virus isolation 
  300- Parma ham  McKercher, Yedloutschnig et al. (1987)  Italian experiment 
Virus isolation 
  112- Iberian loins  Mebus, House et al. (1993); (Mebus, 
Arias et al. 1997) 
In vivo and in vitro virus assay (hemadsorption, 
immunofluorescence, virus isolation, serum of 
experimentally infected pigs tested for 
antibodies) 
  140 days  CFSPH (2010)   
Salted (cured), 
Fermented and 
dried (salami) 
  30 days  McKercher, Hess et al. (1978)   
 
120 days  MacDiarmid (1991) 
AHA (2003) 
 
 
Salted (cured), 
fermented dried 
and spiced 
(pepperoni) 
  30 days  McKercher, Hess et al. (1978) 
 
 
120 days  MacDiarmid (1991)   
Ham in brine    180 days  Blackwell (1983) 
MacDiarmid (1991) 
 
Table continued overleaf. 
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detection (dpi) 
Secreta 
Serum    7 days (ph 13.4) 
Several hours (ph < 4) 
OIE (2013) 
Pirtle et al. (1991) 
 
2 230 days, (without 
preservative, in glass 
flask with rubber cap), 
4-6 °C 
Kovalenko et al. (1972)  Experimental infection lasted 30 days post 
inoculation 
Blood    540 days in  4 °C 
 
CFSPH (2010) 
 
540 days at  4 °C 
 
70 days- on wooden 
surfaces 
USDA (2007)  70 days- on wooden surfaces 
105 days  (putrefied 
blood) 
USDA (2007)  105 days  (putrefied blood) 
2 900 days, lyophilized 
blood in ampoules, 
4-6 °C 
2 230 days, (defibrinated 
blood, without 
preservative), 4-6 °C  
Kovalenko et al. (1972)  Experimental infection. Observation lasted 
30 days post inoculation 
 
 
81 days (summer-
autumn), on boards 
contaminated by ASFV-
infected blood, stored in 
the ground at the depth 
of 12 cm  
 
192 days on boards, 
contaminated by ASF-
infected blood, stored on 
the soil surface 
Kovalenko et al. (1972)  Experimental infection. Observation lasted 30 
ì days post inoculation 
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    112 days  on bricks, 
contaminated by blood, 
stored under the ground 
at the  a depth of 12 cm 
 
81 days in garden soil in 
buried boxes 
 
81 days, contaminated 
forest soil buried in 
boxes 
 
50 days in summer 
176 days in winter 
Lake water containing 
the blood from infected 
pig (dilution 1:100), in 
glass flask, buried at a 
depth of 12 cm 
   
Faeces    60-100 days  Haas, Ahl et al. (1995)   
60-160 days  Strauch (1991)   
  11 days, held in room 
temperature 
Penrith (2009) 
CFSPH (2010) 
Mur, Martinez-Lopez et al. (2012) 
 
 
  159 days, 4-6 °C 
 
155 days, (wet faeces in 
a glass flask buried in 
the ground to a depth of 
12 cm) 
Kovalenko et al. (1972)  Experimental infection. Observation lasted 30 
days post inoculation 
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detection (dpi) 
Urine    45 days (in glass flask 
buried in the ground to a 
depth of 12 cm) 
Kovalenko et al. (1972)  Experimental infection. Observation lasted 30 
days post inoculation 
 
Nasal aerosol    5 min half-life (humidity 
> 30 %) 
 
Donaldson and Ferris (1976)   
  14-19 min  de Carvalho Ferreira et al.  (2012)   
Liquid manure 
(slurry)= manure 
and urine, no 
bedding 
  84 days at 17 °C 
112 days at 4 °C 
Haas et al. (1995)   
  30s-3min at 60 °C  Turner et al. (1999)   
Other 
Bloodsucking 
insects (Stomoxys 
calcitrans- stable 
fly) 
  2 days  Baldacchino, Muenworn et al. (2013)   
ASFV: African Swine Fever Virus; dpi:days post inoculationAfrican swine fever 
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3.  Risk assessment methodology 
3.1.  ToR1: Update the significance of the occurrence and risk of endemicity of ASF in the 
countries neighbouring the EU at higher risk 
3.1.1.  The risk assessment model 
In 2010, a qualitative risk assessment model was developed, dealing with risk factors affecting spread 
of ASFV and assessing the impact of prevention and control measures on the risk for endemicity of 
the disease in the neighbouring countries of the EU (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2010a). The pathways were 
outlined as such that the risk of events leading to potential spread and mitigation could be elicited by 
the experts of the working group. 
ToR1of the current mandate requests for an update of these pathways assessing the risk of endemicity 
in both the wild boar and domestic pig population in the neighbouring countries of the EU. For the 
Scientific Opinion (SO) developed in 2010 (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2010a), one pathway was developed 
for  the  Russian  Federation  and  one  for  Georgia  and  Armenia  separately,  due  to  diverse  farming 
systems‟ structures, different animal density and functioning of the Veterinary Services. These risk 
pathways were updated for the current SO, using the same qualitative model as developed in 2010. For 
the  already  developed  risk  pathways  for  the  Russian  Federation,  on  one  hand,  and  Georgia  and 
Armenia on the other hand, only those risk estimates were re-elicited where new evidence did become 
available since the last assessment, indicating that the risk estimate needed to be re-elicited. 
For Ukraine and Belarus, a new risk pathway was developed, due to the more recent introduction of 
ASFV in these two countries.  Ukraine and Belarus were assessed together, because they have both a 
higher proportion of industrial farms (Ukraine has 8 mil. pigs with 43 % industrial farms and Belarus 
has 4 mil. pigs with 80 % of the farms industrial farms), compared to Georgia and Armenia with a 
much higher proportion of back yard farms (both 95 %, and small pig population size of less then half 
a mill pigs) (FAO, 2013). The proportion of backyard farms will have the biggest impact on the risk 
factors for spread. 
What concerns the assessment of the impact of the mitigation measures, however, it was decided to 
deal with those parameters individually, when they are specific for either Belarus or Ukraine (e.g. the 
rapid stamping out of outbreaks). 
3.1.2.  Expert knowledge elicitation (EKE) 
3.1.2.1.  Choice of hearing experts: 
A  group  of  21  hearing  experts  was  recruited,  who  were  involved  either  in  the  ASF  outbreak 
investigations  or  surveillance  activities  in  the  infected  areas  neighbouring  the  EU,  or  in  risk 
assessments  for  introduction  of  ASFV  into  the  EU.  Care  was  taken  to  have  a  balance  of  the 
geographical origin.  
3.1.2.2.  The approach: 
The  approach  that  was  followed  for  the  EKE  is  a  nominal  group  technique  (NGT),  which  is  a 
combined elicitation approach, making use, on one side of anonymous judgements of experts (so pre-
empting difficulties and biases that may arise from experts having to negotiate a group consensus) and 
on the other hand, allowing some degree of interaction between experts. The latter allowed the experts 
to gain exposure to new arguments or facts about which they may not have been aware, and indeed, 
curing misconceptions (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2014) 
 
The process of the elicitation was as following: 
1)  First elicitation round: the experts were asked to provide their judgements on the risk estimates 
individually through an anonymous web-based survey. The participants were asked to provide the 
rationales for their choices for all the questions they had answered. African swine fever 
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2)  Second elicitation round: feed back on the outcome of the first round was provided to the experts, 
including a summary of the rationales and basic calculations of the results. The experts were then 
asked to revise their answers through the anonymous web-based survey, if wanted, and possible 
update their rationales. 
3)  Third elicitation round: feed back on the second round was provided to the experts, before they 
met physically, including the uncertainty of the estimates.  The measure „Entropy‟ first described 
by  Shannon  (1948)  was  used  to  express  the  uncertainty  of  the  answers  as  such,  which  is  in 
difference to the approach used to describe uncertainty in 2010. 
The following cut-off values were agreed by the working group: low entropy (< 25 %), moderate 
entropy (> 25, < 35 %) and high entropy (> 35 %). The experts agreed on the group estimates which 
had low entropy. For those parameters with high entropy, the experts were asked to provide their 
judgements individually and anonymously after the discussion. The median of the chosen answers was 
taken as the group response, and was used to feed the risk assessment model.  
4)  Feed  back  on  the  update  outcomes  of  the  model  was  provided  to  the  group  of  experts,  and 
conclusions were formulated and agreed upon. 
3.2.  ToR2: The evaluation of the possible pathways of introduction of ASF into the EU, 
ranking them on the basis of their level of risk with a view to enhance preparedness 
and prevention. 
The second ToR requested to evaluate all the possible pathways of introduction of ASFV into the EU, 
and  to  rank  them  on  the  basis  of  their  level  of  risk  with  a  view  to  enhance  preparedness  and 
prevention. After further clarification with the requestor of the mandate, it was decided to address only 
transport of infectious/contaminated matrices for this ToR2. Other potential pathways of introduction 
of ASF were already addressed in the previous Scientific Opinion on ASF (EFSA AHAW Panel, 
2010). Further, movement of infected wild boar and pigs into unaffected areas (e.g. transboundary 
movement of wild boars or movement of free ranging pigs) were already addressed in ToR1 and thus 
these pathways were not considered as a „contaminated matrix‟ that could be transported into the EU.  
Twenty-one experts were asked to judge on the ability of different matrices to contain and maintain 
infectious ASFV. A list of potential matrices of importance for potential introduction of ASFV into the 
EU was developed based on the information published in literature provided in Table 2.  The experts 
were  asked  to  rank  the  different  matrices  according  to  their  increasing  risk  to  be  contaminated/ 
infected and maintain infectious virus at the moment of transportation into the EU, without taking into 
account the possible volumes or amounts transported into the EU. The risk estimates were defined as 
in Table 3. 
Table 3:   Definitions of the risk of different matrices to become contaminated/infected and maintain 
infectious virus at the moment of transportation into the EU  
Score  Risk  Definition 
5  Very High  In nearly all cases, the matrix could be contaminated/infected and maintain infectious 
virus at the moment of transportation into the EU 
4  High  In  most cases, the   matrix could be contaminated/infected and maintain infectious 
virus at the moment of transportation into the EU 
3  Moderate  In some cases the matrix could be contaminated/infected and maintain infectious virus 
at the moment of transportation into the EU 
2  Low  In only rare cases the matrix could be contaminated/infected and maintain infectious 
virus at the moment of transportation into the EU  
1  Very low  In very rare and exceptional cases the matrix could be contaminated/infected and 
maintain infectious virus at the moment of transportation into the EU 
0  Negligible  Sufficiently low to be ignored African swine fever 
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In a second, on-line elicitation round, the experts were asked to rank the risk of the matrices, and 
provided rationales  for  their choices.  The  median  of  the chosen  answers  was  taken  as the  group 
response. 
4.  Results 
4.1.  ToR1: Update the significance of the occurrence and risk of endemicity of ASF in the 
countries neighbouring the EU at higher risk 
4.1.1.  Risk of endemicity in domestic pigs and spreading to unaffected areas 
4.1.1.1.  Georgia and Armenia 
Since the previous risk assessment (EFSA AHAW Panel, 2010a), only limited new information has 
become available on the ASF situation in Georgia and Armenia (see Sections 2.1.1, 2.2.1, and 2.3.1). 
The presence of the disease in the domestic pig population was estimated after considering all the 
information available about possible ASF outbreaks in Georgia and Armenia, and the estimated risk of 
undetected spread of ASF in these countries.  The experts judged that there is a high possibility that 
disease is currently present in the domestic pig population in Georgia and Armenia. The uncertainty of 
this judgement was considered moderate (see Appendix A, Question 1 for the detailed rationales). No 
outbreaks have been recently reported to OIE in these countries but there are some media reports about 
disease in swine, with clinical signs that are consistent with ASF infection. Since 2008, subsequent to 
the ASF incursion, Georgia and Armenia have not been declared free of ASF by the OIE. 
A non-effective long-term response was estimated as a combination of not dealing rapidly with new 
outbreaks and non-effective preventive measures. The experts judged that the risk for a non-effective 
long-term response in G/A remains high, similar to an earlier estimate for 2010. The only parameter 
that was reassessed in this pathway branch was the possibility that clinical signs would be present. All 
the other parameters were assumed to have remained the same. The experts judged that the possibility 
of clinical signs in association with ASF infection is moderate, with a moderate uncertainty.  The 
underlying rationale for this assessment includes the very broad range of presentation of clinical signs, 
ranging from mild to severe signs or per-acute dead in individual animals. This presentation is not 
entirely consistent with the typical clinical signs described in the literature, including experiments. 
Nonetheless, the presence of ASF infection in an epidemiological unit cannot be missed. The presence 
of clinical signs in the field will greatly depend on the route of infection, the infectious dose, and the 
prior immune status of the animals. Even in experiments, there is a wide range of clinical signs in pigs, 
depending on both the infection route and the infectious dose (see Appendix A, Question 2 for the 
detailed rationales). 
The risk of ASF being endemic in the domestic pig population in some areas of Georgia and Armenia 
was estimated by combining the disease presence and the risk of a non-effective long-term response. 
The experts judged that there is a high risk that ASF is endemic in domestic pigs in some areas of 
Georgia and Armenia. The risk of local and long-distance spread were each assessed to be high. 
Therefore, the risk that ASF will spread further into unaffected areas from the endemic areas in 
Georgia and Armenia was considered to be high (see Appendix B, Figure 6). 
4.1.1.2.  The Russian Federation 
The  new  available  information  on  the  ASF  situation  in  the  Russian  Federation  since  the  risk 
assessment in 2010 was summarised in Sections 2.1.2, 2.2.2 and 2.3.2. 
The presence of the disease in the domestic pig population was estimated after considering all the 
information available about possible ASF outbreaks and the estimated risk of undetected spread of 
ASFV  in  the  Russian  Federation.  The  experts  judged  that  the  high  frequency  of  official  disease 
reporting (OIE-WAHID, online), together with the ample published information and media reports, African swine fever 
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suggest that there is a high possibility that the disease is currently present in domestic pigs in the 
Russian Federation. The uncertainty of this judgement was considered low (Appendix A, Question 5).  
A non-effective long-term response was estimated as a combination of not dealing rapidly with new 
outbreaks and non-effective preventive measures. The experts judged that the risk for a non-effective 
long-term response in the Russian Federation remains high, similar to an earlier estimate for 2010. The 
parameters that were reassessed in this pathway branch were the possibility that clinical signs would 
be  present,  the  possibility  that  suspected  cases  would  be  reported  to  the  veterinary  services,  the 
possibility  that  the    outbreak  control  measures  would  be  effective  and  the  possibility  of  tracing 
dangerous contacts in ASF outbreaks (Appendix A, Question 6-9). 
The  experts  judged  that  the  possibility  of  clinical  signs  in  association  with  ASFV  infection  is 
moderate,  with  a  high  uncertainty.  The  reasons  were  similar  to  those  mentioned  above  for  the 
possibility of clinical signs in domestic pigs infected with ASFV in Georgia and Armenia (Appendix 
A, Question 6).  
The experts judged that there is a moderate possibility that farmers report suspected cases to the 
Veterinary Services (moderate uncertainty).  As mentioned in Appendix A, the underlying rationale 
for this judgement included that a financial compensation programme is only implemented in some 
regions of the Russian Federation (with compensation at market price), and farmers may be reluctant 
to report the disease, especially in those areas where no compensation programme is in place, or where 
it  occurs  with  important  delays,  or,  where  the  disease  has  been  circulating  already  for  a  while 
(Appendix A, Question 7).  
The experts judged that the possibility that the Veterinary Services of the Russian Federation can 
control outbreaks effectively and rapidly is low (low uncertainty). The underlying rationale for this 
judgement included the difficulties faced in the backyard sector, leading to delayed diagnosis and lack 
of early response. Stamping out is not always performed as in the EU: not all animals are killed and 
destroyed (Appendix A, Question 8). 
In  most  of  the  backyard  farms,  effective  tracing  is  extremely  complicated,  especially  tracing  of 
informal animal movements and potentially infected pork meat. Therefore, the experts considered that 
in the Russian Federation, the possibility that the Veterinary Services can effectively trace dangerous 
contacts is low (moderate uncertainty), although some effective tracing may be present in commercial 
farms in some regions (Appendix A, Question 9). 
The  risk  of  ASF  being  endemic  in  the  domestic  pig  population  in  some  areas  of  the  Russian 
Federation was estimated by combining the disease presence and the risk of a non-effective long-term 
response. The experts judged that there is a high risk that ASF is endemic in domestic pigs in some 
areas of the Russian Federation. The risk of local and long-distance spread were each assessed to be 
high. Therefore, the risk that ASF will spread further into unaffected areas from the endemic areas 
in the Russian Federation was considered to be high (see Appendix B, Figure 7). 
4.1.1.3.  Ukraine and Belarus 
Since the infection has only been detected in Ukraine in 2012 and in Belarus in 2013, the previous risk 
assessment (EFSA AHAW Panel 2010) did yet not include these countries in the assessment for 
endemicity. For this current update, it was therefore decided that all parameters of the risk pathway 
had to be elicited, however, from some parameters („possible spread of ASFV through pets and pests‟, 
„possible spread of ASFV through ticks (given their presence)‟ or „possible spread of ASFV through 
indirect contact in the environment‟), it was decided that these parameters are not expected to be 
different from the Russian Federation or from Georgia or Armenia and the values can be copied.  
Again, the presence of the disease in the domestic pig population was estimated after considering all 
the information available about possible ASF outbreaks in Ukraine and Belarus, and the estimated risk 
of undetected spread of ASF in these countries. The experts judged that there is a moderate possibility African swine fever 
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that  the  disease  is  present  in  domestic  pigs  in  Ukraine  and  Belarus  (moderate  uncertainty).  The 
underlying rationale for this assessment included the permeability of the border between Belarus and 
the  Russian  Federation  (i.e.  the  so  called  Customs  Union,  which  also  includes  Kazakhstan),  the 
frequent movement of people between the Russian Federation and Ukraine and Belarus, which are 
difficult to monitor or control. Also the possibility of transboundary spread of infected wild boar was 
taken  into  account  for  this  judgement,  as  shown  through  recent  events  in  Ukraine  (Appendix  A, 
Question 12 and 13). 
The experts judged that the most important risk factors possibly leading to undetected spread of 
ASFV in Ukraine or Belarus would be swill feeding and the possible movement of infected pigs 
between backyard holdings. The experts judged that the possibility of undetected spread of ASFV 
through movement of infected pigs or  movement of  contaminated pork would be moderate (both 
judgements had a low uncertainty). Further, the experts judged that the possibility that ASFV could 
spread  by  people,  involved  with  pig-keeping;  through  contaminated  vehicles;  and  through 
contaminated feed would be moderate as well (moderate, moderate and high uncertainty respectively). 
The experts judged that the possibility for undetected spread in the pig population in Ukraine and 
Belarus, through direct contact of pigs with wild boar, and consecutively further spread to domestic  
pigs would be low in Belarus and moderate in Ukraine. This judgement took into account the different 
proportions of backyard farms, their geographic distribution and the possible crossing points with the 
wild boar habitat in both countries. Spill-over into the wild boar population and vice versa will depend 
on the extent of the interface between the two populations. The experts agreed that wild boar play a 
minor role in spread of ASFV compared to illegal movement of pork (followed by swill feeding) and 
they do not play a role in spread to and from farms with a high level of biosecurity (Appendix A, 
Question 14-20). 
A non-effective long-term response was estimated as a combination of not dealing rapidly with new 
outbreaks and non-effective preventive measures. Stamping out is not always performed as in the EU: 
not all animals are killed and destroyed. The experts judged that the risk for a non-effective long-term 
response in Ukraine and Belarus is moderate.   
The parameters that were elicited for this pathway branch were the possibility that clinical signs would 
be  present,  the  possibility  that  suspected  cases  would  be  reported  to  the  veterinary  services,  the 
possibility that the outbreak control measures would be effective, the possibility of tracing dangerous 
contacts in ASF outbreaks, and the possibility of effective preventive measures.  
As for Armenia, Georgia and the Russian Federation, the experts judged that the possibility of clinical 
signs  in  association  with  ASFV  infection  is  moderate,  with  a  high  uncertainty  (Appendix  A, 
Question 21).  
The experts judged that there would be a moderate possibility that farmers would report suspicious 
cases to the Veterinary Services (low uncertainty). Further, they thought that currently, since there 
were only a few outbreaks, the Veterinary Services have been effective to contain the outbreaks and 
identify dangerous contacts. They fear, however, that when there would be more introductions, or 
undetected spread, the situation will become difficult to handle (Appendix A, Question 22-24). 
Concerning  the  possibility  of  effective  preventive  measures,  the  experts  agreed  that  effective 
preventive measures should include passive surveillance to detect outbreaks early and prevent further 
spread of ASFV. Passive surveillance needs to be accompanied by fair compensation programmes and 
awareness  building  of  farmers,  other  players  in  the  pig/pork  market  chain,  and  agricultural  and 
veterinary staff. The experts judged that the possibility that all these preventive measures are carried 
out  effectively  is  low  in  Ukraine  and  Belarus  (low  uncertainty).  The  underlying  rational  for  this 
judgement was that although there are several preventive measures taken in both countries, they are 
not likely to be effective to prevent new outbreaks. Reasons mentioned during the EKE were the lack 
of experience and the occasional and unstructured character of the actions. In summary, that there is 
no plan. On-going preventive measures are sero-surveillance and collection of tissue samples for PCR African swine fever 
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in  industrial  farms  in  Belarus,  and  occasional  sample  collection  in  Ukraine.  Further,  passive 
surveillance and awareness building is carried out in both countries (e.g. to avoid spread via swill, 
infected pigs, etc. and to alert for the economic implications of an outbreak) (Appendix A, Question 
25). 
 
The risk of ASF being endemic in the domestic pig population in some areas of Ukraine and Belarus 
was estimated by combining the disease presence and the risk of a non-effective, long-term response. 
The experts judged that there is a moderate risk that ASF is endemic in the domestic pig population in 
some areas of Ukraine and Belarus. The risk of local and long-distance spread were each assessed to 
be  moderate. Therefore,  the  risk that  ASF will  spread further into  unaffected  areas  from  the 
endemic areas in Ukraine and Belarus was considered to be moderate (see Appendix B, Figure 8). 
4.1.2.  Risk of endemicity in wild boar and spreading to unaffected areas 
4.1.2.1.  Georgia and Armenia 
The  presence  of the  disease  in  the  wild  boar population  was  estimated  after  considering  all  the 
information  available  about  possible  ASF  cases  in  wild  boar  in  Georgia  and  Armenia,  and  the 
estimated risk of undetected spread of ASF in the wild boar population in these countries. 
The  experts  judged  that  based  on  some  unofficial  sources  of  information/media  reports  that  the 
possibility that ASFV is present in the wild boar population is moderate (high uncertainty). It was 
agreed that  this  was  mainly  caused  by  spill-over  from  outbreaks in the domestic  pig  sector. The 
experts judged the population density sufficiently low so that it is unlikely that ASFV will spread 
efficiently in the wild boar population, and so the actual risk of disease presence in the wild boar 
population in the Georgia and Armenia is estimated to be moderate (Appendix A, Question 3). 
A non-effective long-term response was estimated as a combination of not dealing rapidly with new 
cases in wild boar and non-effective preventive measures. The experts judged that the risk for a non-
effective long-term response in Georgia and Armenia is high.   
The only parameter that was reassessed in this pathway branch was the possibility that clinical signs 
would be present. All the other parameters were assumed to have remained the same. The experts 
judged that the possibility of clinical signs in association with ASF infection is moderate, with a 
moderate uncertainty. The experts judged that when wild boar are infected with ASFV, clinical signs 
would be most often present, although some subclinical cases may be present as well. In fact, the 
experts assumed that wild boar and pigs, have the same susceptibility to the virus, and therefore, there 
is  no  reason  to  differentiate  for  the  presence  of  clinical  signs  between  the  two  (Appendix  A, 
Question 4). 
The risk of ASF being endemic in the wild boar population in some areas of Georgia and Armenia 
was estimated by combining the disease presence and the risk of a non-effective, long-term response. 
The experts judged that there is a moderate risk that ASF is endemic in the wild boar population in 
some areas of Georgia and Armenia. The risk that ASF will spread further into unaffected areas 
from the endemic areas in Georgia and Armenia was considered to be low (see Appendix B, Figure 9). 
4.1.2.2.  The Russian Federation 
The  presence  of the  disease  in  the  wild  boar population  was  estimated  after  considering  all  the 
information  available  about  possible  ASF  cases  in  wild  boar  in  the  Russian  Federation,  and  the 
estimated risk of undetected spread of ASF in the wild boar population in this country. 
Based on the information available in Section 1.1.2 and the EKE the experts judged that the possibility 
that ASFV is present in the wild boar population in the Russian Federation is high (Appendix A, 
Question 10). The underlying rational for that judgement were the repeated infected cases of ASFV 
infected wild boar notified during the last years, and other published information available. A different African swine fever 
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prevalence can be expected in the different regions, though, based on the different interaction with the 
domestic  pig  sector,  and  the  subsequent  possibility  of  spill-over  of  ASFV  into  the  wild  boar 
population.  
Again, a non-effective long-term response was estimated as a combination of not dealing rapidly 
with new cases in wild boar and non-effective preventive measures. The experts judged that the risk 
for a non-effective long-term response in the Russian Federation is high. The only parameter that was 
reassessed in this pathway branch was the possibility that clinical signs would be present. All the 
other parameters were assumed to have remained the same. For the same rational as mentioned above, 
the experts judged that the possibility of clinical signs in association with ASF infection is moderate, 
with a high uncertainty (Appendix A, Question 11). 
The risk of ASF being endemic in the wild boar population in some areas of Russian Federation was 
estimated by combining the disease presence and the risk of a non-effective, long-term response. The 
experts judged that there is a moderate risk that ASF is endemic in the wild boar population in some 
areas of The Russian Federation. The risk that ASF will spread further into unaffected areas from 
the endemic areas in The Russian Federation was considered to be moderate (see Appendix B, Figure 
10).  
4.1.2.3.  Ukraine and Belarus 
The  presence  of the  disease  in  the  wild  boar population  was  estimated  after  considering  all  the 
information available about possible ASF cases in wild boar in Ukraine and Belarus, and the estimated 
risk of undetected spread of ASF in the wild boar population in this country. Based on the information 
available in Section 2.1.3, the experts judged that the possibility that ASFV is present in the wild boar 
population in the Ukraine and Belarus is moderate, with a moderate uncertainty. The reasoning behind 
this judgement was that there is no real border with the Russian Federation (i.e. Customs Union), and 
habitat of wild boar spread uninterrupted across the border.  Further, due to the vastness of the forest, 
it is difficult to find infected (i.e. sick and dead) wild boar through passive surveillance. On the other 
hand, it is compulsory to send samples from all killed wild boar for PCR analysis in Belarus and, so 
far, all results have been negative. However, they might not receive a lot of samples compared to the 
number of killed wild boar.  
The risk factors that may lead to spread of ASFV in the wild boar population, which were elicited 
were „the possibility that the currently applied hunting regime could lead to spread of ASFV‟ and „the 
possibility that direct contact between wild boar will lead to spread of ASFV, taking into account the 
specific wild boar population density‟. 
The experts judged that the possibility that direct contact between wild boar will lead to spread in the 
wild boar population in Ukraine and Belarus is low. The underlying rational for this judgement was 
that the wild boar population density is rather patchy in Ukraine and Belarus, however there is only 
scarce quantitative information available about the population demography. Wherever the density is 
low, the chance for spread is expected to be low and vice versa (Appendix A, Question 26, 27, 28 and 
30). 
The experts thought that the possibility that the hunting regime in Ukraine can contribute to spread of 
ASFV into the wild boar population is low, with a low uncertainty. Currently, the hunting regime 
applied in Ukraine is aiming at keeping the population level stable (so no depopulations) and to keep 
also  the  population  at  their  normal  territory  (so  it  should  not  increase  long  distance  dispersal). 
However, there are plans to implement a wild boar depopulation campaign in Lugansk Oblast (in the 
Eastern Border of Ukraine). 
The experts thought that the possibility that the hunting regime in Belarus can contribute to spread of 
ASFV into the wild boar population is moderate, with a high uncertainty. Although there is currently 
no official confirmation of ASFV infection in wild boar in Belarus, it is not allowed to do normal 
hunting. Furthermore, depopulation may stimulate 1) illegal poaching of wild boar, which is difficult African swine fever 
 
EFSA Journal 2014;12(4):3628  34 
to control, and 2) undetected spread. Additionally, the depopulation of wild boar in Belarus may 
attract wild boar from the Russian Federation and it will be difficult to sustain the depopulation on a 
long term basis (due to the high reproduction rate of wild boar) (Appendix A, Question 34). 
Again, a non-effective long-term response was estimated as a combination of not dealing rapidly 
with new cases in wild boar and non-effective preventive measures. The experts judged that the risk 
for a non-effective long-term response in Ukraine and Belarus is high. Parameters that were elicited in 
the pathway branch were the possibility to present clinical signs in association with ASFV infection, 
the possibility to detect a sick wild boar and the possibility that suspicious cases would be reported. 
The outcomes for the elicitation of the possibility for clinical signs and to find sick or dead wild boar 
were the same as mentioned above for Georgia and Armenia. The experts thought that the possibility 
that suspect cases in wild boar are reported to the veterinary service in Ukraine and Belarus is low 
(low uncertainty). For example, in Belarus it is compulsory to send samples from shot boar or boar 
found dead (e.g. on the road), however, not many samples are received. For example, in Ukraine, 685 
sera and 648 tissue samples were received from wild boar during the hunting season in 2013, and all 
of them were tested negative (Appendix A, Question 31). 
The risk of ASF being endemic in the wild boar population in some areas of Ukraine and Belarus was 
estimated by combining the disease presence and the risk of a non-effective, long-term response. The 
experts judged that there is a moderate risk that ASF is endemic in the wild boar population in some 
areas of Ukraine and Belarus. The risk that ASF will spread further into unaffected areas from the 
endemic areas in Ukraine and Belarus Federation was considered to be moderate (see Appendix B, 
Figure 11).  
4.2.  ToR2: The evaluation of all the possible pathways of introduction of ASF into the EU, 
ranking them on the basis of their level of risk with a view to enhance preparedness 
and prevention. 
Table 4:   Ranking of matrices according to their ability to contain and maintain infectious ASFV 
(based on expert elicitation) 
Rank      Matrix 
Very high  Frozen meat 
High  Chilled meat 
Wild boar (transported) 
Domestic pigs (transported) 
Skin fat 
Vehicles for animal transport-contaminated inside  
Moderate  Naturally smoked meat 
Salted, fermented, dried (+/- spiced) meat (e.g. pepperoni, salami,…) 
Salted, dried meat (e.g., salted and dried hams, shoulders, loins…) 
Any vehicles-contaminated outside 
People involved with pig-keeping 
Slurry  
Animal feed 
Litter 
Fomites 
Low  People not involved with pig-keeping 
Ticks 
Very low  Vegetables 
Crops 
Pests (rodents) 
Pets 
Hay and straw 
Bloodsucking insects 
Negligible  Meat cooked for  70 °C for 30 min 
 African swine fever 
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The  experts  judged  that  frozen  meat  coming  from  infected  animals  has  a  very  high  risk  to  be 
contaminated and remain contaminated with infectious ASFV at the moment it would be transported 
over the EU border. The underlying reason for this judgement was that ASFV has been detected for 
several years in frozen meat, depending on the temperature (Adkin et al., 2004; Kolbasov et al., 2011; 
Smirnov et al., 2011) (Table 2). 
The  experts  judged  that  chilled  meat,  wild  boar,  domestic  pigs,  skin  fat  and  vehicles  for  animal 
transport have a high risk to become and remain infected/contaminated with infectious ASFV at the 
moment they are being transported into the EU. 
The underlying rational for this judgement was based on several publications, provided in Table 2. For 
example, ASFV has been detected in chilled meat from infected pigs for several months (Plowright et 
al., 1994; Adkin et al, 2004; Kovalenko et al., 1972 cited by Smirnov and Butko, 2011). Further, 
domestic pigs can shed infectious ASFV from 4 to 70 days post inoculation (Fereirra et al., 2013). 
Infectious virus has been detected in tissues of domestic pigs for up to 500 days (Carrillo, Borca et al. 
1994). In skin fat, ASFV has been detected for 300 days (Adkin et al., 2004). Vehicles for animal 
transport that are not properly disinfected can contain contaminated blood or faeces or other excreta, 
which may contain infectious ASFV for several days, depending on the temperature (Kovalenko et al., 
1972). 
Naturally smoked meat, salted and dried meat, salted fermented and dried meat, any type of vehicle, 
people  involved  with  pig-keeping,  slurry,  animal  feed,  litter  and  fomites  were  judged  to  have  a 
moderate risk to become and remain contaminated with infectious ASFV at the moment they are being 
transported into the EU. The underlying rational for this judgement was based on several publications, 
provided in Table 2. For example, ASFV has been detected in naturally smoked meat for up to 30 dpi 
(Adkin et al., 2004). In salted, dried meat, ASFV can persist for up to 120 days (MacDiarmid, 1991). 
In ham in brine, ASFV can be detected for up to 180 days (Blackwell, 1983). ASFV has been detected 
for more than 100 days in slurry, depending on the temperature (Haas et al., 1995). 
The experts judged that people not involved with pig-keeping have a low risk to become and remain 
contaminated with infectious ASFV at the moment they are being transported into the EU. 
Infectious  ASFV  has  been  detected  for  several  years  in  ticks  (Sanchez  Botija  1982),  however, 
currently there is no field data available suggesting a  long term infection of Ornithodorus ticks in the 
outbreak areas. In addition, the risk of ticks accompanying a transport are considered also low. 
Vegetables, crops, pests, pets, hay and straw and bloodsucking insects were judged to have the lowest 
risk  to  become  and  remain  contaminated  with  infectious  ASFV  at  the  moment  they  are  being 
transported into the EU.  
The experts judged that meat cooked for 70 °C for 30 min. has a negligible risk to become and remain 
contaminated  with  infectious  ASFV  at  the  moment  they  are  being  transported  into  the  EU.  This 
judgement was based on published information. Adkin et al. (2004) demonstrated that meat cooked for 
70 °C for 30 min does not contain infectious ASFV. 
   African swine fever 
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CONCLUSIONS  
Table 5:   Risk estimates for TOR1  
Risk question  Region  Risk 
estimate  Rationale  Overall 
judgement* 
Risk 
estimate 
Domestic pigs  2014  2014  2014  2010 
Risk of ASF 
endemicity in 
some areas of:  
Georgia and 
Armenia 
H   High risk for disease presence and 
limited control measures 
H  M 
Russian Federation  H  High frequency of official reporting 
and challenges in outbreak control 
H  M 
Belarus and 
Ukraine 
M  Only few outbreaks reported but 
continuous risk for re-introduction 
H/M  Not 
done 
Risk of ASF 
spreading to 
unaffected 
areas 
Georgia and 
Armenia 
H  Free-ranging pigs and limited 
control measures 
H  H 
Russian Federation  H  High risk of spread mainly through 
contaminated pork and infected pigs 
H  H 
  Belarus and 
Ukraine 
M  High number of backyard farms and 
depopulation without destroying 
meat 
H/H  Not 
done 
Wild boar 
Risk of ASF 
endemicity in 
some areas of:  
Georgia and 
Armenia 
M  Risk for frequent spill-over from 
domestic pigs and  non-effective 
long term response 
-  L 
Russian Federation  M  -  M 
Belarus and 
Ukraine 
L  -  Not 
done 
Risk of ASF 
spreading to 
unaffected 
area  
Georgia and 
Armenia 
M  Limited spread, which can increase 
when depopulation activities are 
carried out 
-  L 
Russian Federation  M    -  M 
  Belarus and 
Ukraine 
M    -  Not 
done 
*   Overall judgement: before the elicited parameters were inserted in the risk pathways, as shown in Appendix B, the 
experts were asked to write down their overall judgement for the risk for endemicity and spread for the two populations 
together. The median of their answers was taken as the group‟s response.  
 
General  conclusions 
  The literature review and fact-finding for this opinion was updated until 31/01/14. 
  No changes in the sequenced regions of the genome of the Caucasus ASFV strain have been 
detected since the first introduction in Georgia in 2007. 
  Both  field  observations  and  experimental  findings  in  wild  boar  and  domestic  pigs  show  that 
despite high virulence of the ASFV strains involved, clinical signs in wild boar and domestic pigs 
are not always clear and will depend on the infectious route, dose and the immune status of the 
animals. However, in the majority of cases, clinical signs, including mortality, are present.  
  There is currently no sero-surveillance in Georgia, Armenia and the Russian Federation, and thus 
the actual sero-prevalence is unknown. 
  The presence of long-term, non-clinical carriers in the infected neighbouring countries of the EU 
cannot be excluded.  African swine fever 
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  The potential role of long-term, non-clinical carriers in the epidemiology of the disease is not 
known.  
  There is no animal identification system in the infected eastern neighbouring countries of the EU, 
hampering efficient tracing of animal and animal product movements. 
  Current measures to control ASF in the affected countries on all organisational levels are not 
expected to slow the spread of the disease within and outside of the countries. 
  The backyard sector is an important part of pig production in the infected eastern neighbouring 
countries  of  the  EU  and  represents  an  agro-ecological  niche  that  facilitates  spread  of  ASFV, 
mainly due to inadequate biosecurity, e.g. swill feeding, possible movement of infected pigs, or 
contaminated swill or vehicles, and home-slaughter. 
  Intensive hunting pressure applied to the affected populations may increase the risk for spread of 
ASFV in wild boar populations, with particularly severe implications at the international borders.  
Domestic pigs 
  Since 2008, Georgia and Armenia have not been declared free of ASF by the OIE.  
  In Georgia and Armenia, although there is no recent official notification of ASF in domestic pigs, 
the experts rated the risk as high for ASF presence in the domestic pig population. 
  Due to the very limited control measures implemented in Georgia and Armenia, including the lack 
of compensation, the risk that ASF is endemic in Georgia and Armenia has increased to high, and 
the risk that it may spread to unaffected areas remains high. 
  There is a high risk that ASF is endemic in some areas of the Russian Federation, and the risk that 
it will spread into unaffected areas, mainly through movement of contaminated pork, infected pigs 
or contaminated vehicles, is high as well. 
  ASFV was introduced in Ukraine and Belarus in 2012 and 2013, respectively, and there is a 
continuous  risk  of  ASFV  re-introduction  from  the  Russian  Federation  due  to  the  frequent 
movement  of  people  and  pig  products,  as  well  as  the  possibility  of  transboundary  spread 
movement of infected wild boar. 
  Considering the pattern of backyard farms in Ukraine and Belarus, the risk for spread of ASFV is 
considered to be moderate.  
  There are more backyard farms in the west of Ukraine, and progressive movement of the infection 
towards the west of Ukraine will result in an infected area near the EU border, which will be 
difficult to control. 
  Based on the official information, there have been only a few outbreaks in Ukraine and Belarus, 
however, considering unofficial information; these may not have been the first cases. The reported 
outbreaks have all been rapidly controlled rapidly. 
 
  In Belarus, there has been a policy of preventive depopulation and compensation. However, it is 
not compulsory to destroy the meat from culled animals and this may pose an additional risk for 
future spread of ASFV in and from this areas. 
 
  There  are  only  a  limited  number  of  ongoing  activities  that  will  facilitate  early  detection  of 
secondary spread in Ukraine and Belarus. African swine fever 
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  Taking into account the above, the risk that ASF would become endemic in Ukraine and Belarus is 
considered  to  be  moderate  and  the  risk  to  further  spread  into  unaffected  areas  is  considered 
moderate as well.  
 
Wild boar 
  There is a high risk for endemicity in the domestic pig population, leading to a constant spill-over 
of ASFV into the wild boar populations in Georgia and Armenia and the Russian Federation.  
  The low wild boar population density in Georgia and Armenia, even further decreased due to 
mortality,  associated  with  the  occasional  spill-  over  of  ASFV,  results  in  a  moderate  risk  for 
endemicity in the wild boar population and a moderate risk for spread to unaffected areas. 
  In the Russian Federation, the overall risk for endemicity and further spread to unaffected areas in 
the wild boar population remains moderate; however, in those areas with high wild boar density, 
this risk may be higher. 
  The continuous  distribution  of  wild  boar  across the  Russian  Federation,  Ukraine  and  Belarus 
would favour the potential for transboundary spread of ASFV in the region.  
  The currently applied wild boar depopulation regime in Belarus, may increase the risk of spread of 
ASFV. 
  In Ukraine and Belarus, the overall risk for endemicity and spread to unaffected areas in the wild 
boar population is evaluated to be moderate. 
ToR2: 
  The  experts  judged  that  frozen  meat  coming  from  infected  animals  has  a  very  high  risk  of 
contamination, and of remaining contaminated with infectious ASFV at the moment it would be 
transported across the EU border.  
  The  experts  judged  that  chilled  meat  and  skin  fat  coming  from  infected  animals,  wild  boar, 
domestic pigs, and vehicles for animal transport have a high risk of to remaining contaminated 
with infectious ASFV at the moment they are being transported into the EU. 
  Naturally smoked meat, salted and  dried meat, salted fermented and dried meat coming from 
infected animals, any type of vehicle that has been in contact with infected pigs, people involved 
with pig-keeping, slurry, animal feed, litter and fomites were judged to have a moderate risk of to 
becoming  and  remaining  contaminated  with  infectious  ASFV  at  the  moment  they  are  being 
transported into the EU.  
 
  The experts judged that people in infected areas who are not involved with pig-keeping have a low 
risk of becoming and remaining contaminated with infectious ASFV at the point at which they 
moment they are being transported into cross into the EU. 
 
  Infectious ASFV has been detected for several years in ticks (Sanchez Botija 1982), however, 
currently there is no data available suggesting a long-term infection of Ornithodorus ticks in the 
outbreak areas. In addition, the risk of ticks accompanying a transport is also considered low. 
 
  Vegetables, crops, pests, pets, hay and straw and bloodsucking insects were judged to have the 
lowest risk to become becoming and remaining contaminated with infectious ASFV at the moment 
they are being transported into the EU.  African swine fever 
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  The experts judged that meat cooked for 70 °C for 30 min has a negligible risk of remaining 
contaminated with infectious ASFV at the moment they are being transported into the EU. 
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APPENDICES  
APPENDIX A: SUMMARY OF EXPERT KNOWLEDGE ELICITATION  
Question No. 
 
Full answer  Answer  Frequency of answers  Rationale summary 
1.  Disease  presence  in  domestic  pigs  in 
Georgia or Armenia:  
 
How  likely  is  it  that  a  domestic  pig  in 
Georgia or Armenia (Georgia and Armenia) 
is  infected  with  ASFV,  based  on  the 
frequency  of  notification  of  outbreaks  and 
other current available information? 
 
 
 
 
No outbreaks have been notified in 
Georgia  and  Armenia  since  2010, 
and  there  is  no  other  information 
available  that  indicates  ASF 
presence in pigs. 
Negligible  0/21   
 
 
 
          
 
 
Entropy = 0.31 
 
No outbreaks have been notified in 
Georgia  and  Armenia  since  2010, 
but  there  is  some  information 
available  that  indicates  ASF 
presence in pigs. 
Low  2/21    1 expert refers to news from August 2013 on ASF outbreaks 
in domestic pigs (possibly wrong box ticked) 
  1 expert did not provide any rationale  
 
Some outbreaks have been notified 
in Georgia and Armenia since 2010, 
and  there  is  information  available 
that indicates ASF presence in pigs. 
Moderate  16/21    6 experts refer to official reports  
  3 experts mention unofficial information of outbreaks since 
2013 in Armenia 
  1 expert notes that official reports do not reflect real 
epidemiological situation due to improper surveillance and 
diagnostics 
  Additionally 1 expert claims that endemicity may be 
established in Georgia due to difficulties in eradication,  high 
proportion of backyard farming, weak veterinary services 
  6 experts did not provide rationales 
Repeated  outbreaks  have  been 
notified  in  Georgia  and  Armenia 
since  2010,  and  there  is  a  lot  of 
information available that indicates 
ASF presence in pigs. 
High  3/21    2 experts refer to non-official information about ASF 
presence in Georgia and media report on ASF in Russian 
Federation originating from Georgia. 1 of them draws 
conclusion on lack of proper eradication programme.  
  1 expert did not provide any rationale 
2.  Clinical  signs  in  domestic  pigs  in 
Georgia or Armenia:  
 
How likely is it that an ASFV infection with 
the Caucasian strain in domestic pigs results 
in  noticeable  clinical  signs  in  Georgia  or 
Armenia (Georgia and Armenia), taking into 
account the immune status of the population 
at this moment? 
 
Clinical  signs  are  not  present  in 
domestic pigs infected with ASFV 
in Georgia and Armenia. 
Negligible  0/20   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Clinical  signs  are  only  sometimes 
present  in  domestic  pigs  infected 
with  ASFV  in  Georgia  and 
Armenia. 
Low  2/20    1 experts based the response on assumption due to lack of 
data 
  1 expert did not provide any rationale 
 
Clinical  signs  are  most  often 
present  in  domestic  pigs  infected 
with  ASFV  in  Georgia  and 
Armenia. 
Moderate  15/20    1 expert mentions moderate to severe clinical signs 
observed in experimental set up 
  1 expert concludes this response based on mortality rates 
  1 expert refers to no changes in the virus but possibility of 
less clinical signs in the field 
  3 experts point out possibility of Ab              positive 
animals without clinical signs (example in Armenia African swine fever 
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Entropy = 0.32 
between 2010-2011 given by 1 of them), however 
virulence of Caucasian strain is unknown due to lack of 
surveillance 
  1 experts refers to negative results of ASF Ab test ran in 
2010 and claims that herd immunity should not mask 
clinical signs 
  1 expert refers to internet sources without any specific 
details 
  5 experts did not provide any rationale 
  Clinical signs not always present. It depends on the route 
of infection, doses, and prior immunity  
  Difference history what concerns duration of infection 
status of country..some countries are infected for 7 years, 
and others only recently infected 
  Clinical signs are dependent on the source of infection (if 
blood involved or not) 
  No typical signs as in the books 
  Animals may survive infections 
  Experimental infections usually use higher ID as in the 
field. Some experiments with low ID, however show very 
broad spectrum of clinical signs….. 
  Animals that have survived and have high titer of AB will 
not be infected, however, those that have low level of AB 
may become chronic carriers… 
  Virus shedding only during the viraemic period 
  Not many indications that there are a lot of surviving 
animals 
  Carriers have not yet been identified in Russian 
Federation, Georgia and Armenia, Belarus and Ukraine 
  Animals could still spread virus as pig product (even when 
not shedding) 
  The Caucasus and Sardinian strain are not so different 
what concerns pathogenicity 
  Georgia: both cases with clinical and without clinical signs 
observed 
  Armenia: no serosurveillance, but to give an idea, from 10 
samples taken from holding with outbreak one year ago. 
 
Clinical signs are always present in 
domestic pigs infected with ASFV 
in Georgia and Armenia. 
High  3/20    1 expert  refers to no genetic changes in the Caucasian strain 
(Blome et al., 2013) but possibility of unusual clinical 
presentation: unspecific symptoms, peracute deaths (2 
experts) 
  1 expert claims that virus has not adapted since 2007 and at 
least all infected piglets show clinical signs regardless 
possible survivors between adult pigs 
  3 experts did not provide any rationale 
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3.  Disease  presence  in  wild  boar  in 
Georgia or Armenia:  
 
How likely is it that a wild boar in Georgia 
or  Armenia  (Georgia  and  Armenia)  is 
infected with ASFV, based on the frequency 
of notification of outbreaks and other current 
available information? 
 
No outbreaks have been notified in 
Georgia  and  Armenia  since  2010, 
and  there  is  no  other  information 
available  that  indicates  ASF 
presence in wild boar. 
Negligible  1/20   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Entropy = 0.43 
  None of experts did not provide rationales 
No outbreaks have been notified in 
Georgia  and  Armenia  since  2010, 
but  there  is  some  information 
available  that  indicates  ASF 
presence in wild boar. 
Low  4/20    4 experts refers to low density of wild boar population in 
Georgia and Armenia, which enables disease transmission 
cycle, although spill-over from domestic pigs and wild boar 
through backyard farming is possible according to 2 of them 
as ASF was unofficially reported in Armenia in WB years 
ago (2 experts). 1 of these experts mentions wild boar as 
sentinel for ASFV circulation in pigs 
  1 expert refers to WAHID information without any specific 
details 
  1 expert  is certain of spill-over to WB population from 
potentially infected domestic pigs 
  4 experts did not provide rationales 
Some outbreaks have been notified 
in Georgia and Armenia since 2010, 
and  there  is  information  available 
that indicates ASF presence in wild 
boar. 
Moderate  13/20    2 expert mentions limited surveillance in wild boar 
impossible to ascertain anecdotal infection in wild boar 
  1 expert concludes rationale based on mortality rates 
  1 expert refers to internet sources without specific details 
  4 experts did not provide any rationale 
Repeated  outbreaks  have  been 
notified  in  Georgia  and  Armenia 
during the last years, and there is a 
lot  of  information  available  that 
indicates  ASF  presence  in  wild 
boar. 
High  2/20    expert  did not provide any rationale 
4. Clinical signs in wild boar in Georgia 
or Armenia:  
 
How  likely  is  it  that  an  ASF  outbreak  in 
wild boar results in noticeable clinical signs 
in  Georgia  or  Armenia  (Georgia  and 
Armenia)? 
 
Clinical  signs  are  not  present  in 
wild  boar  infected  with  ASFV  in 
Georgia and Armenia. 
Negligible  0/20   
 
 
 
 
 
Entropy = 0.32 
  According to 1 expert- although European wild boar is 
susceptible to ASF (Blome et al., 2012, Blome et al., 2011), 
it is not possible to observe clinical signs in wildlife other 
than post-mortem. 
Clinical  signs  are  only  sometimes 
present  in  wild boar infected  with 
ASFV in Georgia and Armenia. 
Low  2/20    None of experts provided a rationale 
Clinical  signs  are  most  often 
present  in  wild boar infected  with 
ASFV in Georgia and Armenia. 
Moderate  15/20    3 experts refer to experimental studies, which revealed 
presence of acute form of ASF in wild boar (Blome et al, 
2011 and 2013). 1 of the experts points out the route of 
infection performed experimentally differs from natural, 
therefore results should be treated with caution when 
extrapolated to wild boar. 
  1 expert  expects similar virulence of ASFV in wild boar and 
domestic pigs but accounts for possibility of sub-clinical or 
chronic course of disease 
  1 expert mentions possibility of no clinical signs in 
seropositive wild boar on example of testing in Armenia 
(2007-2011) 
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  1 expert refers to mortality rate 
  1 expert refers to internet source and WAHID without any 
specific details 
  5 experts did not provide rationales 
  In experimental infection there is no difference in 
susceptibility between WB and DP 
  No reason to differentiate WB and DP 
Clinical signs are always present in 
wild  boar  infected  with  ASFV  in 
Georgia and Armenia. 
High  3/20    2 experts refer to clinical signs observed in experimental 
infections and field reports, especially that virus did not 
change genetically since 2007 according to 1 of them. 
  1 expert refers to official reports on dead wild boar 
  1 expert mentions that death as the only noticeable symptom 
in wild boar, is challenging to detect due to limited passive 
surveillance and animals scavenging on carcasses in the wild. 
  2 experts did not provide rationales 
5.  Disease  presence  in  domestic  pigs  in 
The Russian Federation: 
 
How likely is it that a domestic pig in The 
Russian Federation (Russian Federation) is 
infected with ASFV, based on the frequency 
of notification of outbreaks and other current 
available information? 
 
No outbreaks have been notified in 
Russian Federation since 2010, and 
there  is  no  other  information 
available  that  indicates  ASF 
presence in pigs. 
Negligible  0/21   
 
 
 
 
 
Entropy = 0.14 
 
No outbreaks have been notified in 
Russian Federation since 2010, but 
there is some information available 
that indicates ASF presence in pigs. 
Low  0/21   
Some outbreaks have been notified 
in  Russian  Federation  since  2010, 
and  there  is  information  available 
that indicates ASF presence in pigs. 
Moderate  2/21    2 experts did not provide rationales 
Repeated  outbreaks  have  been 
notified in Russian Federation since 
2010,  and  there  is  a  lot  of 
information available that indicates 
ASF presence in pigs. 
High  19/21    11 experts refer to official information available through 
OIE, Federal veterinary Services of Russian Federation on 
situations in Russian Federation since 2008. 1 of them also 
mentions insufficient control measures and socioeconomic 
problems in Russian Federation which may contribute to 
virus maintenance 
  1 expert draws conclusion based on mortality rate 
  1 expert mentions endemicity to be almost established in 
some areas of Russian Federation 
  7 experts did not provide rationales 
6. Clinical signs in domestic pigs in The 
Russian Federation: 
 
How  likely  is  it  that  an  ASF  outbreak  in 
domestic  pigs  results  in noticeable  clinical 
signs  in  The  Russian  Federation  (Russian 
Federation)? 
 
Clinical  signs  are  not  present  in 
domestic pigs infected with ASFV 
in Russian Federation. 
Negligible  0/20   
 
 
 
 
Clinical  signs  are  only  sometimes 
present  in  domestic  pigs  infected 
with ASFV in Russian Federation. 
Low  2/20    2 experts did not provide rationales 
Clinical  signs  are  most  often 
present  in  domestic  pigs  infected 
with ASFV in Russian Federation. 
Moderate  11/20    2 experts refer to no genetic changes in viral genome but 
some possibility that evident clinical signs may not be 
evident based on field reports and lack of serosurveillance African swine fever 
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Entropy = 0.40 
  1 expert refers to official and unofficial reports 
  3 experts did not provide rationales 
  Clinical signs not always present. It depends on the route 
of infection, doses, and prior immunity  
  Difference history what concerns duration of infection 
status of country..some countries are infected for 7 years, 
and others only recently infected 
  Clinical signs are dependent on the source of infection (if 
blood involved or not) 
  No typical signs as in the books 
  Animals may survive infections 
  Experimental infections usually use higher ID as in the 
field. Some experiments with low ID, however show very 
broad spectrum of clinical signs….. 
  Animals that have survived and have high titer of AB will 
not be infected, however, those that have low level of AB 
may become chronic carriers… 
  Virus shedding only during the viraemic period 
  Not many indications that there are a lot of surviving 
animals 
  Carriers have not yet been identified in Russian 
Federation, Georgia and Armenia, Belarus and Ukraine 
  Animals could still spread virus as pig product (even when 
not shedding) 
  The Caucasus and Sardinian strain are not so different 
what concerns pathogenicity 
  Georgia: both cases with clinical and without clinical signs 
observed 
  Armenia: no serosurveillance, but to give an idea, from 10 
samples taken from holding with outbreak one year ago. 
   
Clinical signs are always present in 
domestic pigs infected with ASFV 
in Russian Federation. 
High  7/20    3 experts refer to no genetic changes in viral genome since 
2008 
  4 experts mentions that clinical signs though always present 
may be unspecific and therefore misleading 
  2 experts also refer to experimental study demonstrating 
severe clinical signs 
  1 expert refers to official mortality and morbidity reports  
  1 expert is uncertain about the response 
  5 experts did not provide rationales 
7.  Disease  reporting  in  The  Russian 
Federation: 
 
How  likely  is  it  that  suspected  cases  in 
domestic pigs are reported to the veterinary 
service in the Russian Federation? 
In  no  areas  of  the  Russian 
Federation,  suspected  cases  are 
reported to the veterinary services. 
Negligible  0/17   
 
 
 
 
In  a  few  areas  of  the  Russian 
Federation,  suspected  cases  are 
reported to the veterinary services. 
Low  11/7    2 experts mention differences between regions and 
production systems given access to administration as and 
perception of ASF as a proxy 
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Entropy = 0.28 
  1 expert refers to unofficial information without any specific 
details 
  1 expert did not provide any rationale 
  Less reporting in backyard sector than industrial sector 
  Compensation is happening at market price in some regions 
 
In the majority of the areas in the 
Russian Federation, suspected cases 
are  reported  to  the  veterinary 
services. 
Moderate  6/17    4 experts mention limited reporting in backyard production 
due to lack of compensation system. 2 of them mention 
fraudulent practices of masking carcasses, especially in 
backyard production. 1 of them expects less reporting in 
areas, where ASF has already occurred. 
  1 expert refers to absence of funded national eradication 
program, which limits reporting. 
  1 expert concludes that based on visible clinical signs 
  1 expert mentions that reports are present form different part 
of Russian Federation 
  9 experts did not provide rationales 
In the entire Russian Federation, all 
suspected cases are reported to the 
veterinary services. 
High  0/17    1 expert refers to reporting to OIE since 2008 
8.  Effective  control  measures  in  The 
Russian Federation: 
 
Taking  into  account  possible  differences 
between  areas  in  the  Russian  Federation, 
how likely is it that control measures applied 
upon the case confirmation are effective to 
contain  the  outbreak  (e.g.  rapid  stamping 
out)? 
 
In none of the areas of the Russian 
Federation, the Veterinary Services 
are  efficient  in  rapidly  controlling 
the  outbreaks  after  the  case 
confirmation. 
Negligible  0/21   
 
 
 
 
Entropy = 0.24 
 
 
 
 
In  a  few  areas  of  the  Russian 
Federation, the Veterinary Services 
are  efficient  in  rapidly  controlling 
the  outbreaks  after  the  case 
confirmation. 
Low  16/21    1 expert mentions lack of interest of pig producers and 
government, which hampers disease control efforts (e.g. 
uncontroll movements) 
  1 expert mentions lack of veterinary supervision in backyard 
sector (Gogin et al., 2013) 
  4 experts refer to insufficient control measures (FAO, 2013; 
official CVO communication, lack of national eradication 
scheme) 
  1 expert refers to personal communication sources 
  9 experts did not provide rationales 
In the majority of the areas in the 
Russian Federation, the Veterinary 
Services  are  efficient  in  rapidly 
controlling  the  outbreaks  after  the 
case confirmation. 
Moderate  5/21    3 experts mention differences between regions in terms of 
veterinary service activities, budget, level of preparedness 
and education. 1 of them points out a problem of delayed 
application of control measures due to timely diagnosis 
(FAO, 2013) 
  1 expert claims control measures are efficient  and refers to 
website of FSVSP 
  1 expert refers to official and unofficial information without 
any specific details 
In the entire Russian Federation, the 
Veterinary Services are always very 
efficient  in  rapidly  controlling  the 
High  0/21   African swine fever 
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outbreaks  after  the  case 
confirmation. 
9.  Effective  tracing  in  The  Russian 
Federation: 
 
Taking  into  account  possible  differences 
between  areas  in  the  Russian  Federation, 
how likely is it that prevention and control 
measures  in  place  will  identify  dangerous 
contacts and therewith hamper containment 
of the outbreak in the Russian Federation? 
 
 
In none of the areas of the Russian 
Federation, the Veterinary Services 
are  efficient  in  tracing  dangerous 
contacts. 
Negligible  1/21   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Entropy = 0.29 
 
 
 
  1 expert mentions informal tracing procedure reliant on the 
pig owner. 
In  a  few  areas  of  the  Russian 
Federation, the Veterinary Services 
are  efficient  in  tracing  dangerous 
contacts. 
Low  16/21    2 expert mentions uncontrolled movement of pork products 
from ASF affected regions  (Gogin et al., 2013) 
  2 expert mentions insufficient control measures  (FAO), 
2013) such as lack of traceability system 
  1 expert mentions differences between regions 
  3 experts mention that spread is associated with illegal 
movement of products and swill in backyard systems and 
wild boar movement enabling tracing according to 1 of them 
(FAO, 2013) 
  1 expert mentions unofficial and official information without 
any specific details 
  8 experts did not provide rationales 
In the majority of the areas in the 
Russian Federation, the Veterinary 
Services  are  efficient  in  tracing 
dangerous contacts. 
Moderate  4/21    1 expert claims control measures are efficient  and refers to 
website of FSVSP 
  1 expert mentions traceability systems present in commercial 
farms but points out protocol differences between regions 
  2 experts did not provide rationales 
 
In the entire Russian Federation, the 
Veterinary Services are efficient in 
tracing dangerous contacts. 
High  0/21   
10. Disease presence in wild boar in The 
Russian Federation: 
 
How  likely  is  it  that  a  wild  boar  in  The 
Russian Federation (Russian Federation) is 
infected with ASFV, based on the frequency 
of notification of outbreaks and other current 
available information? 
 
No outbreaks have been notified in 
Russian  Federation during the  last 
years,  and  there  is  no  other 
information available that indicates 
ASF presence in wild boar. 
Negligible  1/21   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Entropy = 0.32 
  None of experts provided any rationales 
No outbreaks have been notified in 
Russian  Federation during the  last 
years, but there is some information 
available  that  indicates  ASF 
presence in wild boar. 
Low  0/21   
Some outbreaks have been notified 
in  Russian  Federation  during  the 
last years, and there is information 
available  that  indicates  ASF 
presence in wild boar. 
Moderate  5/21    2 experts mentions ASF surveillance in wild boar but 
diagnosis is incidental according to 1 of them. From 2008-
2010 positive cases in wild boar were reported. 
  1 expert mentions difference between production systems 
and areas with different pig densities as proxy for contact 
between domestic pigs and wild boar 
 
Repeated  outbreaks  have  been 
notified  in  Russian  Federation 
during the last years, and there is a 
High  15/21    5 experts refer to official reports (OIE, FSVSP) and 1 of 
them to unofficial information without any specific details 
  1 expert mentions it is well known fact African swine fever 
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lot  of  information  available  that 
indicates  ASF  presence  in  wild 
boar. 
  2 experts mention that reporting of cases in wild boar creates 
illusion of WB implication in ASF epidemiology 
  7 experts did not provide rationales 
 
11.  Clinical  signs  in  wild  boar  in  The 
Russian Federation: 
 
How  likely  is  it  that  an  ASF  outbreak  in 
wild boar results in noticeable clinical signs 
in  The  Russian  Federation  (Russian 
Federation)? 
 
Clinical  signs  are  not  present  in 
wild  boar  infected  with  ASFV  in 
Russian Federation. 
Negligible  0/20   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Entropy = 0.4 
  1 expert mentions that clinical signs are not evident in wild 
boar apart post-mortem changes (Blome, 2012, 2011) 
Clinical  signs  are  only  sometimes 
present  in  wild boar infected  with 
ASFV in Russian Federation. 
Low  2/20    1 expert mentions that diagnosis in WB is incidental and 
relies on passive surveillance for corpse or animal shooting. 
  2 experts did not provide rationales 
Clinical  signs  are  most  often 
present  in  wild boar infected  with 
ASFV in Russian Federation. 
Moderate  11/20    3 experts refer to experimental studies (Blome, 2013), which 
demonstrated severity of clinical signs in wild boar. One of 
experts mentions challenge to detect them in wild animals. 
Another expert  points out  different conditions of infection  
in experimental set than in real life. 
  1 expert refers to mortality rate 
  1 expert mentions unchanged virulence of ASFV but also 
possibility of existence seropositive wild boar 
  1 expert mentions that presence of ASF appears in epidemic 
waves, therefore herd immunity does not mask clinical signs 
  1 expert refers to unofficial source of information without 
any specific details 
  2 experts did not provide rationales 
  In experimental infection there is no difference in 
susceptibility between WB and DP 
  No reason to differentiate WB and DP 
Clinical signs are always present in 
wild  boar  infected  with  ASFV  in 
Russian Federation. 
High  7/20    2 experts refers to experimentally demonstrated 
susceptibility and high lethality in wild boar 
  2 experts mentions lack of changes in viral genome since 
2007. One of them assumes unusual clinical presentations 
may be present, when the other points out that no sub-clinical 
or chronic disease has been reported in the field. 
  4 experts did not provide rationales 
12.  Disease presence in domestic pigs in 
Ukraine: 
 
How  likely  is  it  that  a  domestic  pig  in 
Ukraine is infected with ASFV, based on the 
frequency  of  notification  of  outbreaks  and 
other current available information? 
 
No outbreaks have been notified in 
Ukraine since 2010, and there is no 
other  information  available  that 
indicates ASF presence in pigs. 
Negligible  3/21   
 
 
 
  1 expert refers to the last outbreak in 2012 in Ukraine, which 
originated from Krasnodar region of the Russian Federation 
and was successfully contained 
  1 expert claims there is no signs of ASF presence in Ukraine 
at present. 
  1 expert did not provide any rationale  
No outbreaks have been notified in 
Ukraine  since  2010,  but  there  is 
some  information  available  that 
indicates ASF presence in pigs. 
Low  2/21    None of experts did not provide rationales 
Some outbreaks have been notified 
in Ukraine since 2010, and there is 
information available that indicates 
ASF presence in pigs. 
Moderate  16/21    4 experts refer to one officially reported outbreak in Ukraine 
and 2 of them refer to outbreaks in Russian Federation in 
vicinity to Ukrainian boarder 
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Entropy = 0.31 
  2 experts  mentions frequent contacts between the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine along lengthy boarder as risk for new 
outbreaks in Ukraine 
  2 expert refers to OIE reports 
  1 expert refers to unofficial information on additional 
outbreaks in Ukraine 
  7 experts did not provide rationales 
Repeated  outbreaks  have  been 
notified in Ukraine since 2010, and 
there  is  a  lot  of  information 
available  that  indicates  ASF 
presence in pigs. 
High  0/21   
13.  Disease presence in domestic pigs in 
Belarus:  
 
How  likely  is  it  that  a  domestic  pig  in 
Belarus is infected with ASFV, based on the 
frequency  of  notification  of  outbreaks  and 
other current available information? 
 
No outbreaks have been notified in 
Belarus since 2010, and there is no 
other  information  available  that 
indicates ASF presence in pigs. 
Negligible  0/21   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Entropy = 0.34 
 
No outbreaks have been notified in 
Belarus  since  2010,  but  there  is 
some  information  available  that 
indicates ASF presence in pigs. 
Low  2/21  None of experts did not provide rationales 
Some outbreaks have been notified 
in Belarus since 2010, and there is 
information available that indicates 
ASF presence in pigs. 
Moderate  15/21    1 expert refers to officially reported outbreaks and to 
frequent contacts with the Russian Federation 
  3 experts mention vicinity to Ukraine and the Russian 
Federation and permeability of boarder with the Russian 
Federation as the risk of reintroduction of ASF to Belarus   
  1 expert is uncertain about this question 
  2 experts claim the spread in Belarus may be larger than 
officially recognised. 1 of them mentions possibility of 
spread thru transboundary wild boar and unreported 
outbreaks in backyard sector. 
  8 experts did not provide rationales 
Repeated  outbreaks  have  been 
notified in Belarus since 2010, and 
there  is  a  lot  of  information 
available  that  indicates  ASF 
presence in pigs. 
High  4/21    3 experts refer to media information on additional outbreaks 
and mortalities in pigs or other unofficial information 
  1 expert refers to unofficial communication with local 
veterinarians 
14. Spread by movement of domestic pigs 
in  Ukraine  and  Belarus  considering  the 
proportion  of  backyard  sector  versus 
commercial  sector  available  in  these    2 
countries: 
 
How  likely  is  it  that  ASFV  will  spread 
through  movement  of  domestic  pigs  in 
Ukraine and Belarus (Belarus and Ukraine) 
resulting  in  direct  contact  between  pigs 
(including  intentional  movement  through 
In all farms in Belarus and Ukraine, 
biosecurity  measures  only  allow 
restricted  pig  movement  (e.g. 
quarantine...) from farm to farm. 
Negligible  0/21   
 
 
 
 
 
 
In  most  farms  in  Belarus  and 
Ukraine, biosecurity measures only 
allow restricted pig movement (e.g. 
quarantine….) from farm to farm. 
Low  5/21    1 expert recognises higher risk in backyard farms 
  1 expert claims that movement of pigs in the backyard sector 
and large industrial units is of no importance for disease 
spread, only traditional free ranging systems in some of the 
areas 
  3 experts did not provide rationales 
In  most  farms  in  Belarus  and  Moderate  16/21    1 expert claims biosecurity is higher in Belarus than in African swine fever 
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transport  or  unintentional  through  free 
ranging)? 
 
Ukraine,  the  poor  biosecurity 
measures  in  place  allow  pig 
movements  between  farms  with 
limited control. 
 
 
Entropy = 0.24 
Ukraine given the proportion of backyard holdings. 
  1 expert claims biosecurity is higher in Ukraine than in 
Belarus given prompt reaction to ASF outbreaks. 
  2 experts mention low biosecurity level in both countries 
with possible illegal movement of animals and their products 
  1 expert mentions differences between industrial and 
backyard holdings. 
  1 expert mentions OIE reports and unofficial information 
without any specific details 
  1 expert`s choice is based on experience extrapolated from 
the Russian Federation 
  9 experts did not provide rationales 
There are no biosecurity measures 
in place in Belarus and Ukraine, so 
pig movements are not controlled. 
High  0/21   
15.  Spread  by  movement  of  pork  in 
Ukraine  and  Belarus  considering  the 
proportion  of  backyard  sector  versus 
commercial  sector  available  in  these    2 
countries: 
 
How  likely  is  it  that  ASFV  will  spread 
through movement of pork in Ukraine and 
Belarus  (Belarus  and  Ukraine)  resulting  in 
indirect contact between pigs (for example, 
swill feeding)? 
 
In  all  pig  farms  in  Belarus  and 
Ukraine,  biosecurity  measures  do 
not allow swill-feeding. 
Negligible  0/21   
 
 
 
 
Entropy = 0.27 
 
In  most  pig  farms  in  Belarus  and 
Ukraine  biosecurity  measures  do 
not allow swill-feeding. 
Low  2/21    None of experts did not provide rationales 
In  most  pig  farms  in  Belarus  and 
Ukraine,  the  poor  biosecurity 
measures  in  place  allow  swill-
feeding. 
Moderate  17/21    5 experts mention swill feeding as a common practice in U 
and B, especially in the backyard holdings according to 2 of 
them and used without thermal treatment according to 1 of 
them 
  2 expert mention higher risk in Ukraine than in Belarus given 
the proportion of backyard holdings (FAO, 2013) 
  1 expert refers to unofficial sources of information without 
any specific details 
  1 expert bases a choice upon personal assumption 
  8 experts did not provide rationales 
There are no biosecurity measures 
in place in the pig farms in Belarus 
and  Ukraine  so  swill  feeding  is  a 
common practice. 
High  2/21    None of experts did not provide rationales 
16.  Spread  by  movement  of  people 
involved in pig keeping sector (backyard, 
semi-commercial,  small  holders  and 
industrial)  in Ukraine and Belarus: 
 
How likely is spread through movement of 
people involved with pig-keeping in Belarus 
and Ukraine? 
 
In all farms in Belarus and Ukraine, 
the  good  biosecurity  measures  in 
place  eliminate  the  possibility  of 
ASFV  spread  by  people  involved 
with pig keeping. 
Negligible  0/21   
 
 
 
 
 
In  most  farms  in  Belarus  and 
Ukraine,  the  good  biosecurity 
measures  in  place  eliminate  the 
possibility  of  ASFV  spread  by 
people involved with pig keeping. 
Low  4/21    1 expert mentions higher risk in western Ukraine given the 
proportion of backyard holdings with limited biosecurity, as 
involvement of infected blood is needed to facilitate spread 
by people. 
  3 experts did not provide rationales 
 
In  most  farms  in  Belarus  and  Moderate  16/21    3 expert mentions differences between industrial and African swine fever 
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Ukraine,  the  poor  biosecurity 
measures in place do not eliminate 
the possibility of ASFV spread by 
people involved with pig keeping. 
 
 
Entropy = 0.29 
small/backyard holdings (pig keeping vs. pig keeping) 
  1 expert bases a choice upon personal assumption 
  1 expert refers to unofficial information without any specific 
details 
  1 expert recognises higher risk in Ukraine than in Belarus 
given different proportion of backyard holdings 
  10 experts did not provide rationales 
 
There are no biosecurity measures 
in  place  in  Belarus  and  Ukraine, 
resulting in an uncontrolled spread 
of ASFV spread by people involved 
with pig keeping. 
High  1/21    None of experts did not provide rationales 
17.  Spread  by  movement  of  people  not 
involved  in  pig  keeping  sector,  who  are 
less likely to come in direct contact with 
pigs in Ukraine and Belarus (other than 
people  mentioned  in  the  previous 
question): 
 
How likely is spread through movement of 
people not involved in pig keeping sector in 
Belarus and Ukraine? 
 
In all farms in Belarus and Ukraine, 
the  good  biosecurity  measures  in 
place  do  not  allow  people  not 
involved  in  pig  keeping  sector  to 
come in contact with pigs. 
Negligible  2/19   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Entropy = 0.38 
  None of experts did not provide rationales 
In  most  farms  in  Belarus  and 
Ukraine,  the  good  biosecurity 
measures  in  place  do  not  allow 
people not involved in pig keeping 
sector to come in contact with pigs. 
Low  12/19    2 expert s mention that probability of spread by people not 
involved in pig keeping is low due to small number of 
outbreaks and due to limited contact with animals 
  5 experts did not provide rationales 
  The virus could be on clothes, shoes, hands, though unlikely 
that this is the major factor of spread 
  Lot‟s of people may visit farms… 
 
In  most  farms  in  Belarus  and 
Ukraine,  the  poor  biosecurity 
measures in place do allow people 
not involved in pig keeping sector 
to come in contact with pigs. 
Moderate  5/19    2 expert mentions differences between industrial and small 
holdings, where in small holding visitors are unconstrained 
according to 1 of them 
  1 expert mentions involvement by consumers unaware of 
risk, spreading ASFV with products 
  1 expert bases a choice upon personal assumption 
  1 expert refers to unofficial sources of information without 
any specific details 
  1 expert concludes higher risk in Ukraine than in Belarus 
given different proportion of backyard sector and therefore 
low biosecurity. 
  7 experts did not provide rationales 
There are no biosecurity measures 
in  place  in  Belarus  and  Ukraine, 
resulting in an uncontrolled contact 
of  people  not  involved  in  pig 
keeping sector with pigs. 
High  0/19   
18a. Spread by wild boar in Belarus: 
 
How  likely  is  spread  through  spill-over  of 
ASFV  from  domestic  pigs  into  wild  boar 
In all farms in Belarus and Ukraine, 
the  good  biosecurity  measures  in 
place  do  not  allow  wild  boar  to 
come in contact with pigs. 
Negligible  1/18   
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populations  and  further  transmission  to 
domestic pigs? 
 
In  most  farms  in  Belarus  and 
Ukraine,  the  good  biosecurity 
measures in place do not allow wild 
boar to come in contact with pigs. 
Low  12/18   
 
 
Entropy = 0.34 
  2 expert s mention higher risk in backyard sector than in 
large farms, especially in those in vicinity to the Russian 
Federation according to 1 of them 
  1 expert points out that only free-ranging or scavenging on 
carcasses or leftovers is required to spill-over from pigs to 
wild boar.  
In  most  farms  in  Belarus  and 
Ukraine,  the  poor  biosecurity 
measures  in  place  do  allow  wild 
boar to come in contact with pigs. 
Moderate  5/18    1 expert mentions high densities of wild boar in western 
areas of Belarus and Ukraine and hunting practices, when 
pigs can feed on WB carcass leftovers 
  2 expert mention differences between regions and production 
systems 
  1 expert concludes higher risk in Ukraine than in Belarus 
given proportion of low-biosecured farms 
  1 expert bases a choice upon personal assumption 
  1 expert mentions that WB acts as a dead-end and 
reintroduction back to domestic pig population exists only in 
free-range production (anecdotal involvement of straw was 
never confirmed) 
  1 expert refers to unofficial source of information without 
any specific details 
  9 experts did not provide rationales 
There are no biosecurity measures 
in  place  in  Belarus  and  Ukraine, 
resulting in an uncontrolled contact 
of wild boar with pigs. 
High  0/18    1 expert  refers  to backyard sector 
18b. Spread by wild boar in Ukraine: 
 
How  likely  is  spread  through  spill-over  of 
ASFV  from  domestic  pigs  into  wild  boar 
populations  and  further  transmission  to 
domestic pigs? 
 
In all farms in Belarus and Ukraine, 
the  good  biosecurity  measures  in 
place  do  not  allow  wild  boar  to 
come in contact with pigs. 
Negligible  0/20  Entropy =  0.28 
 
   
In  most  farms  in  Belarus  and 
Ukraine,  the  good  biosecurity 
measures in place do not allow wild 
boar to come in contact with pigs. 
Low  7/20     
In  most  farms  in  Belarus  and 
Ukraine,  the  poor  biosecurity 
measures  in  place  do  allow  wild 
boar to come in contact with pigs. 
Moderate  13/20    Differences in wild boar habitats in U and B…. 
  Different geograpical distribution of backyard farming and 
free range farming 
  Spill-overs into wild boar and vice versa will depend on the 
interface between the two populations 
  Wild boar may be a minor contribution to spread of ASFV as 
compare to illegal movement of pork 
  Wild boar do not play a role as spread factor for high 
biosecurity farms 
 
There are no biosecurity measures 
in  place  in  Belarus  and  Ukraine, 
resulting in an uncontrolled contact 
of wild boar with pigs. 
High  0/20     
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19.  Spread  by  vehicles  in  Ukraine  and 
Belarus: 
 
How  likely  is  spread  of  ASFV  through 
movement  of  vehicles  between  farms  (e.g. 
lorries,  cars,  tractors,  farm  machinery) 
resulting in indirect contact in Belarus and 
Ukraine? 
 
 
In all farms in Belarus and Ukraine, 
the  good  biosecurity  measures  in 
place  do  oblige  vehicles  to  be 
disinfected between farm visits and 
allow  vehicles  to  enter  only  into 
restricted areas on the farms. 
Negligible  1/21   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Entropy = 0.34 
  None of experts provided rationale for their choice 
In  most  farms  in  Belarus  and 
Ukraine,  the  good  biosecurity 
measures  in  place  do  oblige 
vehicles to be disinfected between 
farm  visits  and  allow  vehicles  to 
enter  only  into  restricted  areas  on 
the farms. 
Low  3/21    1 expert notices less risk in case of movement within Belarus 
and Ukraine but more between Russian Federation and 
Belarus and Ukraine. 
  2 experts refers to minor role of vehicles in ASF spread 
given low transmissibility of virus (1) and presence of blood 
required for spread (1). 
In  most  farms  in  Belarus  and 
Ukraine,  the  poor  biosecurity 
measures  in  place  do  not  always 
oblige  vehicles  to  be  disinfected 
between  farm  visits  and  do  allow 
vehicles to enter the farms. 
Moderate  16/21    3 experts mention differences between sectors with higher 
risk associated in  backyard and small holdings than in 
industrial sector (2). 1 of them points out that fomites have 
been incriminated in secondary spread of ASF in the Russian 
Federation. 
  1 expert refers to unofficial sources of information without 
any specific details 
  1 expert conclusion is based on experience from the Russian 
Federation. 
  11 experts did not provide rationales 
There are no biosecurity measures 
in  place  in  Belarus  and  Ukraine, 
resulting in uncontrolled movement 
of  vehicles  in  farms  and  no 
disinfection between farm visits. 
High  1/21    1 expert mentions no disinfection programme in place. 
20.  Spread  by  feed  (other  than  swill) in 
Ukraine and Belarus: 
 
How  likely  is  spread  of  ASFV  through 
movement of contaminated feed resulting in 
indirect contact in Belarus and Ukraine? 
 
In all farms in Belarus and Ukraine, 
the  good  biosecurity  measures  in 
place  do  not  allow  feed  to  be 
transported from farm to farm. 
Negligible  2/20   
 
 
 
 
Entropy = 0.51 
  1 expert questions the feasibility of feed contamination with 
infected blood 
In  most  farms  in  Belarus  and 
Ukraine,  the  good  biosecurity 
measures in place do not allow feed 
to be transported from farm to farm. 
2/20  6/20    2 experts mention some risk during outbreaks or if feed 
comes from endemic areas, especially in small farms and 
backyard holdings according to 1 of them. 
  4 experts did not provide rationales 
In  most  farms  in  Belarus  and 
Ukraine,  the  poor  biosecurity 
measures  in  place  do  not  always 
prevent  that  feed  is  transported 
from farm to farm. 
Moderate  10/20    1 expert refers to evident involvement of feed in outbreaks in 
Belarus 
  1  expert refers to oftenly unknown origin of feed 
  1 expert mentions differences between industrial and small 
holding/backyard sector 
  1 expert refers to unofficial information without nay specific 
details 
  1 expert explains that uncontrolled feed movement is present 
however spread of ASF by feed is not possible 
  8 experts did not provide rationales 
  Low likelihood that feed will be contaminated by infected 
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blood 
  Infected feed could be thrown away and eaten by free 
ranging animals 
  Second outbreak in Belarus was with infected feed 
 
There are no biosecurity measures 
in  place  in  Belarus  and  Ukraine, 
resulting in uncontrolled movement 
of feed between farms. 
High  2/20    1 expert mentions evident role of infected feed in ASF 
spread 
21.  Clinical  signs  in  domestic  pigs  in 
Ukraine and Belarus: 
 
How  likely  is  it  that  an  ASF  outbreak  in 
domestic  pigs  results  in noticeable  clinical 
signs in Belarus and Ukraine? 
 
Clinical  signs  are  not  present  in 
domestic pigs infected with ASFV 
in Belarus and Ukraine. 
Negligible  0/20   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Entropy = 0.39 
 
Clinical  signs  are  only  sometimes 
present  in  domestic  pigs  infected 
with ASFV in Belarus and Ukraine. 
Low  2/20    None of the experts provided any rationales 
Clinical  signs  are  most  often 
present  in  domestic  pigs  infected 
with ASFV in Belarus and Ukraine. 
Moderate  12/20    1 expert refers to unchanged genetic structure and results of 
experimental studies, however mentions field reports on less 
severe clinical signs. 
  1 expert refers to official and unofficial sources of 
information without any specific details 
  6 experts did not provided rationales 
 
Clinical signs are always present in 
domestic pigs infected with ASFV 
in Belarus and Ukraine. 
High  16/20    2 experts refer to genetically unchanged viral structure since 
2007 
  2 experts refers to results of experimental studies and/or field 
observations demonstrating high mortality and evident 
clinical signs 
  3 experts mention that clinical signs may be unspecific, 
especially if disease is novel in the region according to 1 of 
them OR if animals are sero-converted according to another. 
  1 expert refers to lack of immunity in ASF free 
countries/region to mask clinical presentations 
  5 experts did not provide rationales 
  Clinical signs not always present. It depends on the route 
of infection, doses, and prior immunity  
  Difference history what concerns duration of infection 
status of country..some countries are infected for 7 years, 
and others only recently infected 
  Clinical signs are dependent on the source of infection (if 
blood involved or not) 
  No typical signs as in the books 
  Animals may survive infections 
  Experimental infections usually use higher ID as in the 
field. Some experiments with low ID, however show very 
broad spectrum of clinical signs….. 
  Animals that have survived and have high titer of AB will African swine fever 
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not be infected, however, those that have low level of AB 
may become chronic carriers… 
  Virus shedding only during the viraemic period 
  Not many indications that there are a lot of surviving 
animals 
  Carriers have not yet been identified in Russian 
Federation, Georgia and Armenia, Belarus and Ukraine 
  Animals could still spread virus as pig product (even when 
not shedding) 
  The Caucasus and Sardinian strain are not so different 
what concerns pathogenicity 
  Georgia: both cases with clinical and without clinical signs 
observed 
  Armenia: no serosurveillance, but to give an idea, from 10 
samples taken from holding with outbreak one year ago. 
22.  Disease  reporting  in  Ukraine  and 
Belarus: 
 
How  likely  is  it  that  suspected  cases  in 
domestic pigs are reported to the veterinary 
service in Belarus and Ukraine? 
 
In no areas of Belarus and Ukraine, 
suspected cases are reported to the 
veterinary services. 
Negligible  0/21   
 
 
 
Entropy = 0.22 
 
In  a  few  areas  of  Belarus  and 
Ukraine,  suspected  cases  are 
reported to the veterinary services. 
Low  2/21    None of experts provided any rationales 
In  the  majority  of  the  areas  of 
Belarus  and  Ukraine,  suspected 
cases are reported to the veterinary 
services. 
Moderate  18/21    1 expert mentions differences between countries with less 
reporting in Ukraine 
  2 expert mentions differences between regions/countries in 
regards to access to administration, compensation scheme, 
proportion of backyard sector, low ASF awareness and 
experience 
  1 expert mentions lack of reporting in backyard sector 
  2 experts refer to official report an one to unofficial sources 
of information without any specific details 
  1 expert `s conclusion is based on experience from Russian 
Federation. 
  11 experts did not provide rationales 
In the entire Belarus and Ukraine, 
all suspected cases are reported to 
the veterinary services. 
High  1/21    None of the experts provided any rationales 
23. Effective control measures in Ukraine 
and Belarus: 
 
In the entire Ukraine and Belarus how likely 
is it that control measures applied upon case 
confirmation  are  effective  to  contain  the 
outbreak (e.g. rapid stamping out)? 
 
 
Remain the same. No elicitation. 
In no areas of Belarus and Ukraine, 
the Veterinary Services are efficient 
in  rapid  outbreak  control  upon 
confirmation. 
Negligible  0/21     
In  a  few  areas  in  Belarus  and 
Ukraine,  the  Veterinary  Services 
are  efficient  in  rapid  outbreak 
control upon confirmation. 
Low  4/21    2 experts mention lack of experience with ASF. 1 of them 
points out differences between Ukraine and Belarus when the 
other compares situation to the Russian Federation. 
  2 experts did not provide any rationales 
In  the  majority  of  the  areas  in 
Belarus and Ukraine, the Veterinary 
Services  are  efficient  in  rapid 
Moderate  14/21    3 experts mention differences between countries or regions, 
with better prepared Veterinary services in Ukraine 
according to one of them African swine fever 
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outbreak control upon confirmation. 
 
 
Entropy = 0.38 
  1 expert mentions efficient control in case of an outbreak but 
remains sceptical about control of epidemics 
  1 expert refers to official and unofficial sources of 
information without any specific details 
  9 experts did not provide any rationales 
  One outbreak is easy to control, but if the situation 
will continue as in Russian Federation, it will not be 
manageable 
 
In the entire Belarus and Ukraine, 
the Veterinary Services are always 
very  efficient  in  rapid  outbreak 
control upon confirmation. 
High  3/21    1 expert claims both countries are able to control infection if 
officially confirmed, however questions control of multiple 
outbreaks 
  2 experts did not provide any rationales 
24.  Effective  tracing  in  Ukraine  and 
Belarus: 
 
How likely is it that prevention and control 
measures  in  place  will  identify  dangerous 
contacts and therewith hamper containment 
of the outbreak in the Ukraine and Belarus 
(Belarus and Ukraine)? 
 
 
In none of the areas in Belarus and 
Ukraine,  the  Veterinary  Services 
are  efficient  in  tracing  dangerous 
contacts. 
Negligible  0/21   
 
 
Entropy = 0.30 
 
In  a  few  areas  in  Belarus  and 
Ukraine,  the  Veterinary  Services 
are  efficient  in  tracing  dangerous 
contacts. 
Low  10/21    1 expert refers to unofficial sources of information without 
any specific details 
  1 expert mentions lack of any tracing system in place 
  2 experts refer to lack of experience of VS with ASF or lack 
of any information about the disease, similarly to the Russian 
Federation according to 1 of them 
  6 experts did not provide any rationales 
 
In  the  majority  of  the  areas  in 
Belarus and Ukraine, the Veterinary 
Services  are  efficient  in  tracing 
dangerous contacts. 
Moderate  11/21    2 experts mention differences between countries, with 
supposedly worse preparedness in Belarus given spread to 
distant locations 
  1 expert`s conclusion is based on effective control of 
outbreaks  
  8 experts did not provide any rationales 
In the entire Belarus and Ukraine, 
the Veterinary Services are efficient 
in tracing dangerous contacts. 
High  0/21   
25.Active Surveillance in domestic pigs in 
Ukraine and Belarus: 
 
How likely it is that active surveillance in 
the domestic pig population will take place 
in Belarus and Ukraine? 
What  are  preventive  measures  in  the 
country  after  the  outbreaks,  to  prevent  
or early detect secondary spread and to 
have an effective long term response? 
•  In risk situation passive surveillance  
should be carried out very ‘actively’ 
Nowhere  in  Belarus  and  Ukraine 
active  surveillance  takes  place  in 
pigs. 
Negligible  0/20      1 expert mentions no information available on any activities 
  1 expert questions the role of active surveillance in detection 
of ASF primary outbreak given high mortality rate 
Only in some areas in Belarus and 
Ukraine  active  surveillance  takes 
place in pigs. 
Low  17/20    2 experts mention some surveillance activities in place on the 
boarder with the Russian Federation and 1 of them questions 
the role of active surveillance in detection of ASF primary 
outbreak given high mortality rate 
  1 expert claims there is no active surveillance programme in 
place 
  1 expert  mentions possible activities in some districts 
  1 expert mentions no information available on planned 
surveillance African swine fever 
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and should be accompanied with 
compensation and awareness 
building of farmers…. 
•  This could be accompanied with 
serology to detect missed cases and 
focus the vigilance in specific areas 
 
 
 
Entropy = 0.18 
  9 experts did not provide any rationales 
  Sero-surveillance and tissue samples for PCR is on-going in 
industrial farms in Belarus 
  Occasional sample collection happening in Ukraine, and 
passive surveillance and awareness building is carried out to 
avoid spread via swill, infected pigs etc. to alert for 
economic implications of an outbreak. 
 
In  most  areas  in  Belarus  and 
Ukraine  active  surveillance  takes 
place in pigs. 
Moderate  3/20    1 expert refers to active surveillance activities to be in place 
but questions its role in detection of first cases. 
  3 experts did not provide any rationales 
Everywhere in Belarus and Ukraine 
active  surveillance  takes  place  in 
pigs. 
High  0/20    None of experts provided any rationales 
26.  Disease  presence  in  wild  boar  in 
Ukraine: 
 
How likely is it that a wild boar in Ukraine 
is  infected  with  ASFV,  based  on  the 
frequency  of  notification  of  outbreaks  and 
other current available information? 
No outbreaks have been notified in 
Ukraine since 2010 and there is no 
other  information  available  that 
indicates  ASF  presence  in  wild 
boar. 
Negligible  0/20   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Entropy = 0.30 
  1 expert refers to OIE reports and expects more surveillance 
in place 
  1 expert mentions that none of wild boar tested was found 
seropositive and passive surveillance is limited, however 
questions the role of wild boar as ASF maintenance host   
  6 experts did not provide any rationales 
 
No outbreaks have been notified in 
Ukraine  since  2010  but  there  is 
some  information  available  that 
indicates  ASF  presence  in  wild 
boar. 
Low  1/20    3 experts mention recent case of ASF in wild boar in Ukraine 
and 1 of them believes ASF will die out in wild boar 
population given its entry from eastern side, where 
population of wild boar is not abundant. 1 of them mentions 
forced migration of WB toward Ukraine due to WB 
extermination programme in Rostov Oblast and also very 
low densities of WB in the affected area in Ukraine. 
  1 expert refers to 2012 outbreak in backyard sector and 
unofficial information without any specific details 
  1 expert mentions poor control of ASF in wild boar 
  1 expert refers to ASF presence on the boarder 
  1 expert expects further spread given higher densities.  
  3 experts did not provide any rationales 
Some outbreaks have been notified 
in Ukraine since 2010 and there is 
information available that indicates 
ASF presence in wild boar. 
Moderate  15/20    2 experts refer to the confirmation of ASF in wild boar in 
Ukraine in January 2014 
  Situation has changed, there is a recent notification of  1 
infected wild boar 
  Couple of carcasses found  
  Scattered distribution of wild boar 
  Hunting of wild boar in the Russian Federation 
  More information needed on wild boar density, surveillance 
activities 
  685 sera tested…xxx organs tested and were all negative 
  There is evidence that prior to the recent detection the WB 
was free, and stamping out of positive boar has been carried 
out, but reintroduction possible 
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Repeated  outbreaks  have  been 
notified in Ukraine since 2010 and 
there  is  a  lot  of  information 
available  that  indicates  ASF 
presence in wild boar. 
High  4/20    None of experts provided any rationales 
27.  Disease  presence  in  wild  boar  in 
Belarus: 
 
How likely is it that a wild boar in Belarus is 
infected with ASFV, based on the frequency 
of notification of outbreaks and other current 
available information? 
 
No outbreaks have been notified in 
Belarus since 2010 and there is no 
other  information  available  that 
indicates  ASF  presence  in  wild 
boar. 
Negligible  0/20   
 
 
 
 
Entropy = 0.45 
  1 expert refers to OIE reports and expects more surveillance 
in place 
  1 expert refers to lack of outbreaks in domestic pigs from 
which ASF could spill over to WB 
No outbreaks have been notified in 
Belarus  since  2010  but  there  is 
some  information  available  that 
indicates  ASF  presence  in  wild 
boar. 
Low  5/20    1 expert refers to ASF presence on the boarder 
  1 expert expects further spread given higher densities.  
  1 expert refers to media information on WB population 
control in Belarus and questions this action. 
  1 expert refers to official OIE reports and unofficial 
information without any specific details 
  6 experts did not provided any rationales 
Some outbreaks have been notified 
in Belarus since 2010 and there is 
information available that indicates 
ASF presence in wild boar. 
Moderate  10/20    1 experts mentions possible infection of WB due to lack of 
control 
  1 expert mention media reports on WB cases in Belarus, 
which have never been confirmed officially. This infection 
may have originated from infected transboundary WB from 
the Russian Federation or from unreported outbreaks in 
backyard sector in B. 
  2 experts did not provide any rationales 
  No real border with Russian Federation…there is connected 
WB habitat 
  Sero surveillance is on-going, and all negative results 
  Compulsory to send samples from all killed WB for PCR 
analysis, and results are negative 
  Difficult  passive surveillance, vast forest so difficult to find 
infected wild boar 
 
Repeated  outbreaks  have  been 
notified in Belarus since 2010 and 
there  is  a  lot  of  information 
available  that  indicates  ASF 
presence in wild boar. 
High  5/20   
28.  Epidemiological role of wild boar in 
Ukraine and Belarus, taking into account 
population densities: 
 
What is the risk that ASFV spreads in the 
wild boar population in Belarus and Ukraine 
due to direct or indirect contact? 
 
ASFV  will not spread in the wild 
boar  population  in  Belarus  and 
Ukraine. 
Negligible  0/20      None of experts provided any rationales 
ASFV will spread in the wild boar 
population in Belarus and Ukraine 
to a limited extend. 
Low  12/20    2 experts conclusion is on basis of low densities of wild boar 
  3 experts notice different densities of wild boar with western 
and southern tendency to increase 
  1 expert refers to official and unofficial information without 
any specific details 
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Entropy = 0.29 
  2 experts did not provide any rationales 
ASFV will spread efficiently in the 
wild boar population in Belarus and 
Ukraine. 
Moderate  8/20    1 expert refers to presence of ASF on the boarder with the 
Russian Federation 
  2 experts mention of possibility to spread in higher densities, 
but not maintenance according to 1 of them 
  1 expert mentions higher contact rate in Belarus given higher 
population density 
  6 experts did not provide any rationales 
  Spread is linked to the density of the wild boar population , 
when the density is low, the chance for spread is low 
  The wild boar distribution is patchy 
  No good quantitative WB density information available 
  A sick  WB will even move less 
 
ASFV  will  spread  very  efficiently 
in  the  wild  boar  population  in 
Belarus and Ukraine. 
High  0/20    None of experts provided any rationale 
29. Clinical signs in wild boar in Ukraine 
and Belarus : 
 
How  likely  is  it  that  an  ASF  outbreak  in 
wild boar results in noticeable clinical signs 
in  Ukraine  and  Belarus  (Belarus  and 
Ukraine)? 
 
Clinical  signs  are  not  present  in 
wild  boar  infected  with  ASFV  in 
Belarus and Ukraine. 
Negligible  0/20   
 
 
 
Entropy = 0.39 
  1 expert reasons it is difficult to observe clinical signs in the 
wild, especially if unspecific 
  1 expert bases on lack of current outbreak-cases 
 
Clinical  signs  are  only  sometimes 
present  in  wild boar infected  with 
ASFV in Belarus and Ukraine. 
Low  6/21    1 expert refers to lack of surveillance programmes in wild 
boar 
  2 experts did not provide any rationale 
 
Clinical  signs  are  most  often 
present  in  wild boar infected  with 
ASFV in Belarus and Ukraine. 
Moderate  12/20    1 expert refers to lack of genetic changes in viral genome  
  1 expert mentions clinical signs are always present but could 
be unspecific 
  1 expert refers to official and unofficial information without 
any specific details 
  3 experts did not provide rationales 
  In experimental infection there is no difference in 
susceptibility between WB and DP 
  No reason to differentiate WB and DP 
Clinical signs are always present in 
wild  boar  infected  with  ASFV  in 
Belarus and Ukraine 
High  6/20    2 experts refer to experimental results demonstrating high 
mortalities and severe clinical signs but 1 of them expects 
some unspecific symptoms as well, though virus has not 
changes 
  1 expert argues that there is no immunity in population, 
therefore  clinical signs should be evident 
  1 expert argues that WB is as susceptible as DP and expects 
high mortalities 
  6 experts did not provide any rationale 
30.  Epidemiological role of wild boar in 
Ukraine and Belarus, taking into account 
population densities : 
Sick/dead  wild  boar  infected  with 
ASFV will not be found in Belarus 
and Ukraine. 
Negligible  2/21      None of experts provided any rationales 
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How  likely  it  is  that  dead/sick  wild  boar 
infected  with  ASFV  will  be  found  in 
Ukraine and Belarus (Belarus and Ukraine)? 
 
Sick/dead  wild  boar  infected  with 
ASFV  will  only  sometimes  be 
found in Belarus and Ukraine. 
Low  17/21 
 
 
Entropy = 0.27 
  1 expert refers to no active surveillance programme in place 
  4 experts reason with large forest size, low WB population 
density or poor presence of people in forests 
  2 experts mentioned scavenging as a limiting factor 
  1 expert refers to unofficial sources of information without 
any specific details 
  1 expert mentions some surveillance activities  
  9 experts did not provide rationales 
Most  often,  sick/dead  wild  boar 
infected with ASFV will be found 
in Belarus and Ukraine. 
Moderate  2/21    2 experts mentioned commercial hunting or hunting 
management in place, however passive surveillance is 
limited only to hunting season according to 1 of them 
Sick/dead  wild  boar  infected  with 
ASFV  will  always  be  found  in 
Belarus and Ukraine. 
High  0/21   
31. Disease reporting by hunters or game 
wardens in Ukraine and Belarus: 
 
How likely is it that suspect cases in wild 
boar are reported to the veterinary service in 
Belarus and Ukraine? 
 
In no areas of Belarus and Ukraine, 
suspect  cases  are  reported  to  the 
veterinary services. 
Negligible  0/17   
 
 
Entropy = 0.24 
  1 expert mentions no information provided from hunters up 
to now. 
  2 experts provided no rationale 
 
In  a  few  areas  of  Belarus  and 
Ukraine, suspect cases are reported 
to the veterinary services. 
Low  13/17    1 expert mentions negative perception of implications 
following the reporting and is unsure about awareness of 
hunters or game wardens 
  1 expert mentions probable fraudulent practices among 
hunters e.g. hiding 
  1 expert concludes based on presence of clinical signs 
  10 experts provided no rationale 
  As long as hunting is on-going, the hunters will report cases 
in Ukraine (e.g. 685 sera and 648 tissue samples were 
received in 2013) 
  It is compulsory to send samples from shot boar or boar 
found dead (e.g. on road), however not very many samples 
are received in Belarus 
  Compliance will depend on the control measures 
implemented in the area 
 
In  the  majority  of  the  areas  of 
Belarus and Ukraine, suspect cases 
are  reported  to  the  veterinary 
services. 
Moderate  4/17    1 experts based this choice on internet source (but no further 
specification) 
  2 experts reason that there is a high awareness of hunters 
(both countries and high risk), and they will report 
  1 expert did not give a rationale 
In the entire Belarus and Ukraine, 
all suspect cases are reported to the 
veterinary services. 
High  0/17    1 expert mentions possible reporting to veterinary services, 
but not to OIE 
32.  Active  surveillance  in  wild  boar  in 
Ukraine and Belarus: 
 
How likely is it that active surveillance in 
the wild boar population will take place in 
Nowhere  in  Belarus  and  Ukraine 
active  surveillance  takes  place  in 
wild boar. 
Negligible  2/21   
 
  1 expert questions usefulness of active surveillance in 
detection of primary outbreaks 
  1 expert did not provide any rationale 
Only in some areas in Belarus and 
Ukraine  active  surveillance  takes 
Low  15/21    1 expert does not understand the question 
  1 expert reasons with sometimes unspecific clinical sign African swine fever 
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Belarus and Ukraine? 
 
 
Remains the same. No elicitation 
place in wild boar. 
 
 
Entropy = 0.39 
  1 expert mentions no surveillance in place 
  1 expert questions usefulness of depopulations of WB in 
Belarus  
  1 expert doubts there is any surveillance in place and expects 
active surveillance schemes to be developed for WB 
  10 experts provided no rationale 
  See previous discussion 
 
In  most  areas  in  Belarus  and 
Ukraine  active  surveillance  takes 
place in wild boar. 
Moderate  3/21    None of experts provided any rationales 
Everywhere in Belarus and Ukraine 
active  surveillance  takes  place  in 
wild boar. 
High  1/21    None of experts provided any rationales 
33. Hunting for wild boar in Ukraine: 
 
What is the chance that the hunting regime 
can contribute to spread of ASFV into the 
wild boar population in Ukraine?  
 
The  performed  hunting  does  not 
lead  to  spread  of  ASFV  into  the 
wild boar population. 
Negligible  0/20   
 
 
 
 
 
Entropy = 0.18 
  1 expert refers to low hunting rate and low spread through 
hunting in respect to natural virus spread 
 
The  performed  hunting  does  lead 
occasionally  to  spread  of  ASFV 
into the wild boar population. 
Low  17/20    3 experts reason that hunting is not forbidden in Ukraine, and 
widely practiced by villagers (pig keepers), and can facilitate 
virus spread 
  on the other hand, 1 expert says that it can decrease the WB 
density and it may help to prevent the introduction, or at least 
the spread within the wild boar population 
  10 experts did not provide any rationale 
  Hunters leave tissues and blood behind, which may infect 
other boar 
  It is a known fact  that hunting can increase spread of 
infectious diseases 
  Currently, the hunting regime applied in U is  aiming at 
keeping the population level stable (so no depopulations 
  The purpose of the current regime is to keep also the 
population at their normal territory (so it should not increase 
migration) 
   
The  performed  hunting  does 
regularly  lead  to  spread  of  ASFV 
into the wild boar population. 
Moderate  3/20    1 expert mentions that some hunters keep BY pigs and do not 
clean the area from carcases  after shooting 
  3 experts provided no rationale 
The performed hunting is the main 
driver of spread of ASFV into the 
wild boar population. 
High  0/20   
34. Hunting for wild boar in Belarus: 
 
What is the chance that the hunting regime 
can contribute to spread of ASFV into the 
wild boar population in Belarus?  
 
The  performed  hunting  does  not 
lead  to  spread  of  ASFV  into  the 
wild boar population. 
Negligible  0/20   
 
  None of experts provided any rationale 
The  performed  hunting  does  lead 
occasionally  to  spread  of  ASFV 
into the wild boar population. 
Low  7/20    3 experts reason that hunting is not forbidden in Belarus, and 
widely practiced by villagers (pig keepers), and can facilitate 
virus spread 
  on the other hand, 1 expert says that it can decrease the WB 
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Entropy = 0.47 
density and it may help to prevent the introduction, or at least 
the spread within the wild boar population 
  10 experts did not provide any rational 
The  performed  hunting  does 
regularly  lead  to  spread  of  ASFV 
into the wild boar population. 
Moderate  8/20    1 expert  reasons hunting may spread ASFV to bordering 
countries, while limiting spread within the country 
  1 expert mentions that some hunters keep BY pigs and do not 
clean the area from carcases  after shooting 
  1 expert mentions that emergency depopulation in the radius 
of 20 km from infected farms can increase spread in Belarus 
  2 experts provided no rationale 
•  Depopulation campaign is on-going in Belarus  in the whole 
territory 
•  It is not allowed to do normal hunting 
•  Depopulation may stimulate illegal poarching of wild boar, 
which is difficult to control 
•  Currently there is no infection in WB, and there is therefore 
no spread of the virus in the population 
•  If WB depopulation in Belarus, this may attract WB from 
Russian Federation 
•  It is difficult to sustain depopulation (high reproduction rate) 
 
The performed hunting is the main 
driver of spread of ASFV into the 
wild boar population. 
High  5/20   
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APPENDIX B: UPDATED RISK PATHWAYS  
 
Figure 6:   Risk pathway 1: domestic pigs in Georgia and Armenia 
See EFSA AHAW Panel (2010a) for the detailed explanation of the model and matrices. African swine fever 
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Figure 7:   Risk pathway 1: domestic pigs in The Russian Federation 
See EFSA AHAW Panel (2010a) for the detailed explanation of the model and matrices. African swine fever 
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Figure 8:   Risk pathway 1: domestic pigs in Ukraine and Belarus 
See EFSA AHAW Panel (2010a) for the detailed explanation of the model and matrices. African swine fever 
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Figure 9:   Risk pathway 2: wild boar in Georgia and Armenia 
See EFSA AHAW Panel (2010a) for the detailed explanation of the model and matrices. African swine fever 
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Figure 10:  Risk pathway 2: wild boar in the Russian Federation 
See EFSA AHAW Panel (2010a) for the detailed explanation of the model and matrices. African swine fever 
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Figure 11:  Risk pathway 2: wild boar in Ukraine and Belarus 
See EFSA AHAW Panel (2010a) for the detailed explanation of the model and matrices. 
   African swine fever 
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APPENDIX C: DETAILED OUTCOMES OF RAKING OF MATRICES ACCORDING TO THEIR RISK OF BEING CONTAMINATED/INFECTED WITH ASFV 
AND MAINTAIN INFECTIOUS ASFV AT THE MOMENT OF CROSSING THE EU BORDER 
Matrix of ASFV   Negli- 
gible 
Very 
low 
Low  Mode- 
rate 
High  Very 
high 
Final 
rank   
Graph 
Live animals  
Wild boar (transported)  0  1  0  3  8  7  H 
 
Domestic pigs (transported)  0  0  0  2  8  9  H 
 
Fresh meat 
Chilled meat  0  0  0  3  11  5  H 
 
Frozen meat  0  0  0  2  5  12  VH 
 
Skin fat  0  1  2  3  10  2  H 
 
Meat products African swine fever 
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Meat  cooked for  70 °C for 30 min  12  6  1  0  0  0  N 
 
Naturally smoked meat  0  1  3  12  3  0  M 
 
Salted, dried meat (e.g., salted and dried 
hams, shoulders, loins…) 
1  2  1  6  6  3  M 
 
Salted, fermented, dried (+/- spiced) meat 
(e.g. pepperoni, salami,…) 
 
2  1  1  6  7  2  M 
 
Vehicles 
Vehicles  for  animal  transport-
contaminated inside  
0  1  2  4  10  2  H 
 
Any vehicles-contaminated outside   0  4  4  8  2  1  M 
 
Persons African swine fever 
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People involved with pig keeping or wild 
boar (e.g. farmers, vets, hunters)  
0  1  2  12  2  2  M 
 
Non-  professional  in  pig  sector  (e.g. 
tourists business, family…) 
2  5  5  7  0  0  L 
 
Slurry   0  1  3  7  6  2  M 
 
Vegetables  8  11  0  0  0  0  VL 
 
Crops  6  12  1  0  0  0  VL 
 
Animal feed  2  5  2  7  2  1  M 
 
  0  1  8  8  2  0  M 
 African swine fever 
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Fomites   0  1  7  8  1  0  M 
 
Pets  7  9  2  1  0  0  VL 
 
Pest (rodents)  2  9  5  2  1  0  VL 
 
Ticks  2  3  7  5  0  2  L 
 
Bloodsucking insects  7  10  2  0  0  0  VL 
 
Hay and straw  4  11  4  0  0  0  VL 
 
 African swine fever 
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GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS: 
HB high biosecurity pig sector: specialized, industrial pig holdings with generally a high level of 
biosecurity. 
LB: low biosecurity sector: pig holdings with a low to non-existent level of biosecurity. 
 
 
AHAW Panel    EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare 
ARRIAH    All-Russian Institute for Animal Health 
ASFV       African Swine Fever Virus 
dpi      days post inoculation 
EFSA      European Food Safety Authority 
EKE      Expert Knowledge Ellicitation 
FAO      Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
OIE      World Organisation for Animal Health 
WAHID    World Animal Health Information Database 
 